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The global pharmaceutical market, valued at USD 1,057 bil-
lion, is almost three times the value of the international smart-
phone market. The best-selling pharmaceutical product in 
2014, a treatment for rheumatoid arthritis called Humira, gen-
erated USD 11.8 billion in sales in that year alone. Can a late-
comer like South Korea catch up with, let alone surpass, suc-
cessful pharmaceutical industries in such a massive global mar-
ket? Korea might be the world’s leading producer of elec-
tronics, smartphones, and other such high-tech products, beat-
ing the competition in the United States and Europe, yet its 
pharmaceutical industry lags far behind the standard of its 
American and European counterparts. Korea’s pharmaceutical 
industry is struggling, and the reason why, as Chandler (2005, 
p. 5) explains, is the high entry barrier to the global pharma-
ceutical market. I hope this study enhance our understanding 
on the industrial policy in pharmaceutical industry and provide 
valuable insights to the policy development in the industry. I 
give great thanks to Prof. Alistair McGuire and Prof. Margaret 
Kyle in participating in this research.  
December, 2015
Sangho Kim, President
Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
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Chapter 1 introduces Korea’s pharmaceutical industry devel-
opment since the 1970s. The Korean government began to rec-
ognize and grant patents on substances in 1987, which opened 
the industry’s eye to the R&D investment. Korean pharmaceut-
ical companies began to develop their own new drugs, starting 
with Sunpla, in the 2000s. The majority of these drugs, how-
ever, exclusively targeted the domestic market and resulted in 
little competitiveness on a global scale. The Ministry of Health 
and Welfare of Korea launched the R&D Projects since 1995, As 
the amount of government R&D investment has been steadily 
rising in Korea, many have criticized the redundancy of invest-
ments made by multiple departments and agencies and the lack 
of interdepartmental cooperation it reflects. 
The key to the competitiveness of a nation’s health technol-
ogy lies first and foremost in the strength and caliber of its re-
search institutions, The factors limiting or promoting the suc-
cess of academic-industrial collaboration are relatively clear. 
According to various studies, limiting factors include the dis-
agreement among the involved parties over the objectives, the 
smallness of Korean pharmaceutical companies and their pools 
of experts, the lack of accurate valuations of technology, and 
the inefficiency of the system for distributing rewards of 
Abstract <<
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collaboration. Furthermore, The health insurance system plays 
a decisive role in the innovation and spread of health technol-
ogy in a given society. 
Naturally, as pharmaceutical innovation is complex, in-
centive driven, and involves R&D efforts from both the public 
and private sectors, outcomes differ from nation to nation. 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical innovation and policies remain 
under-analyzed topics in the research community. Following 
chapters will discuss  the economics of direct investment in 
pharmaceutical R&D by the government, academic-industrial 
collaboration, and insurance benefits and pricing. 
Chapter 2  summarizes the economic case for innovation 
policy, describes how innovation policy is implemented in 
practice, and describes the evidence on the effects of in-
novation policy. First, We investigate the “pull” policies aiming 
to increase the private benefits associated with innovation and  
“Push” policies targeting the costs. 
The most widely used “pull policy” around the world today is 
the granting of intellectual property rights, particularly patents. 
However, the long-run dynamic efficiency (incentives for in-
novation that contributes to welfare over time) yielded by pat-
ents comes at the cost of short-run static costs. In the extensive 
(mostly theoretical) literature on the economics of patents, it is 
generally accepted that patents do not provide optimal 
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incentives. Alternatives to patents include govern-
ment-sponsored prizes for innovation or ex ante commitments 
to purchase a minimum quantity at a specified price. 
“push” policies encourage greater investment in R&D by re-
ducing the costs of that investment. Such policies include tax 
credits for R&D investment, grants for research performed in 
universities or other organizations, and the establishment of 
government research centers that perform research internally. 
Most governments in developed countries employ some mix of 
these. Push policies have a number of weaknesses, however. 
First, the information burden for a policymaker is considerably 
higher than for pull policies. Second, push policies also require 
policymakers to confront potential moral hazard on the part of 
grant recipients. The section 3 of this chapter begins with a 
discussion of economic models of how best to allocate funding 
across diseases and their shortcomings, and provide an over-
view of empirical studies in this area.
Under some conditions, pull and push policies can be de-
signed to achieve identical expected outcomes at the same ex-
pected costs. In practice, pull policies are more attractive in 
situations where the information burden is particularly large, 
where capital markets function well, and where government 
funders are risk averse. Push policies are favored when the 
promotion of spillovers is especially important and if capital 
markets undervalue R&D. 
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Chapter 3 overviews on the regulatory reform in healthcare 
sector in general and its impact on R&D. Worldwide, health 
sector regulation has extended beyond traditional concerns 
with safety and efficacy, to evidence of performance and value. 
Such changes directly impact on the ability of a health sector to 
innovate, as DRGs tend to benchmark the average practice and 
value based pricing attempts to restrict new technology 
diffusion.
Value-based pricing looks to estimate the value of a drug 
based on available evidence of performance. The value-based 
pricing (VBP) approach can be widened to incorporate factors 
such as the burden of illness in society, the unmet need ad-
dressed, the budget impact of up-take, the degree of in-
novation judged to be associated with the drug and the wider 
social benefits derived from the drug. 
In the pursuit of static efficiency through price regulation all 
the major European markets now appear to support some form 
of value-based pricing (VBP) where value and subsequent prod-
uct reimbursement price is explicitly linked to the incremental 
health benefit produced (OFT, 2007; Moise and Docteur, 2007). 
As reimbursement is increasingly tied to product value, some 
have argued that all dimensions of value must be taken account 
off, and that the highest levels of reimbursement should be giv-
en to the most innovative products. In France and Germany 
many product reimbursements reflect innovative value, where 
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innovative value is aligned with health benefit within a given 
therapeutic area. While England appears to be implementing a 
reimbursement system, like Canada and Sweden, based on 
health benefit as determined largely through implementation of 
cost-effectiveness thresholds. 
Little is known about the interaction between patent pro-
tection and price regulation. If price regulation distorts ex-
pected revenues, then there will be an adverse influence on 
R&D investments. If there is strong patent protection this may 
offset these distortionary effects, but if patent protection is too 
strong this provides incentives for over-investment in R&D. 
One form of regulation thus influences the other. Efficient reg-
ulation should reward both innovative R&D and products ach-
ieving high health benefits.
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Session 1  Introduction
Every new technology that is successfully commercialized 
creates a formidable barrier to the market in the form of piling 
knowledge. The increasingly distant entry barrier in pharma-
ceuticals had its origins in the 1880s, when numerous enter-
prises began developing and producing chemical and biological 
technologies and products. Keun Lee and Franco Malerba 
(2014) has argued that it is relatively easy for a newcomer to 
catch up with rivals in industries with short technology 
lifespans. However, in industries such as the pharmaceutical 
industry, where the speed of change in the knowledge base of a 
technology tends to be quite slow, it is difficult for newcomers 
to catch up. (Conversely, latecomers have a much better 
chance of success in industries in which old knowledge is re-
garded as obsolete, and so investors would be better off inves-
ting in these industries.)
How do government’s policies on the pharmaceutical in-
dustry facilitate and promote a leapfrogging ahead by means of 
Korean Pharmaceutical 
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technological innovation? Thomas (1994) noted that the French 
pharmaceutical companies’ share of the export market remains 
stagnant, while at the same time UK companies’ have been 
growing. He identified the causes for their success in the UK 
government’s policies on the approval of drugs, prices, and the 
national innovation system. The United Kingdom imposed far 
more rigorous criteria for the approval of pharmaceutical 
products than did France, which tended to be quite lenient to-
ward the French pharmaceutical companies. The United 
Kingdom also adopted a business-friendly policy on pricing 
and actively encouraged foreign investment by loosening regu-
latory requirements as part of its active foreign competition 
policy. France, on the other hand, kept strict control over 
pharmaceutical prices and maintained a strict protectionist 
policy to shield French pharmaceutical companies against 
competition from American, Swiss, and other rivals. Finally, in 
the interest of innovation, the UK government ensured effec-
tive cooperation among the government, hospitals, and phar-
maceutical companies. By contrast, French pharmaceutical 
companies depended upon governmental research institutions 
extensively, while their networks with the medical community 
weakened.
Pharmaceutical industries worldwide have undergone dra-
matic changes since Thomas (1994)’ study was published. With 
the declining productivity of pharmaceutical research and de-
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velopment (R&D) and the rising average cost of drug develop-
ment, pharmaceutical companies no longer attempt to produce 
best-selling products in-house, but rather research and develop 
new products via a virtually integrated network of open in-
novation worldwide. Forming partnerships with universities 
and other research institutes for R&D, these companies out-
source pre-clinical and clinical tests to contract research or-
ganizations (CROs), production to contract manufacturing or-
ganizations (CMOs), and sales and distribution to contract sales 
organizations (CSOs). In adopting such a strategy, the compa-
nies are able to minimize both costs and development risks. In 
the meantime, with the age of personalized medicines dawning, 
genetic screening and molecular marker technologies are be-
ginning to allow medical practitioners to formulate customized 
prescriptions for individual illnesses with reduced side effects, 
enhanced patient safety, and better adaptation to new treat-
ment regimes.
Examining how governments of advanced economies are 
adapting to these changes on the pharmaceutical market and 
what factors latecomers like Korea should consider in develop-
ing their pharmaceutical policies are surely fertile fields of 
research. Yet little research on these areas has been done to 
date. This study therefore discusses some of the issues 
involved.
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Session 2  Korea’s pharmaceutical industry today
Until the late 1970s, the Korean government played a large 
role in fostering the pharmaceutical industry with strong pro-
tectionist measures, such as a ban on the imports of drugs that 
were made locally. Yet the industry lacked competitiveness due 
to a critically dearth of investment in R&D. In the 1980s, with 
the ban on pharmaceutical imports lifted and the pharmaceut-
ical market liberalized, Korean pharmaceutical companies 
were forced to compete with foreign counterparts that pos-
sessed far more financial, technological, marketing, and man-
agement resources and expertise. Over the years since then, 
the imbalance of pharmaceutical trade has worsened. Once the 
Korean government began to recognize and grant patents on 
substances in 1987, pharmaceutical companies could no longer 
produce active substances without patent permissions. This sit-
uation led them to realize that the key to survival was the de-
velopment of new drugs, which in turn opened their eyes to the 
central importance of R&D investment. 
However, it was not until the 1990s that the Korean govern-
ment began to foster and support the pharmaceutical industry 
systematically as a source of significant wealth and 
employment. In 1995, the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
launched the first of a series of Public Health and Medicine 
R&D Projects, and in 1999 it established the Korea Health 
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Industry Development Institute (KHIDI). In 2011, the National 
Assembly enacted the Special Act on Supporting and Fostering 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, and then in 2013 the Korean gov-
ernment announced its first five-year plan for advancing the 
pharmaceutical industry according to that Act. The five-year 
plan envisioned making Korea one of the seven global centers 
of pharmaceuticals and raising the value of its pharmaceutical 
exports from KRW 2.3 trillion in 2012 to KRW 23 trillion by 
2020. The plan also aimed to increase the number of Korean 
companies among the world’s top 50 pharmaceutical compa-
nies from zero in 2012 to two by 2020 and to develop globally 
best-selling new drugs from zero in 2010 to three by 2020. To 
these ends, the plan called for increasing government invest-
ment in R&D projects, raising a public fund for fostering the 
pharmaceutical industry, developing specialized workforces, 
providing strategic support for exports, and developing cut-
ting-edge industry clusters and other infrastructure.
Korean pharmaceutical companies began to develop their 
own new drugs, starting with Sunpla, in the 2000s. The majority 
of these drugs, however, exclusively targeted the domestic 
market and resulted in little competitiveness on a global scale. 
Although the government and the private sector continue to in-
crease investment in pharmaceutical R&D, the road to success-
ful commercialization remains long and winding. There is thus 
a need to develop a new and more effective model of pharma-
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ceutical innovation.
As of 2014, the Korean pharmaceutical market amounted to 
KRW 19 trillion in value. However, this estimate was based 
upon production data and not sales data. The actual market 
may therefore be bigger. Based on financial statements pub-
lished by Korea’s pharmaceutical companies, Yuhan 
Corporation was the highest grossing in 2014 with KRW 1 tril-
lion in sales. According to the IMS, the top 10 pharmaceutical 
companies in Korea collectively account for 28.7 percent of 
gross revenue on the pharmaceutical market. Multinational 
corporations like Pfizer, MSD, and Novatis still top the list. We 
may surmise, then, that the Korean pharmaceutical industry is 
sufficiently globalized and subject to fierce competition among 
a great number of companies.
Korean pharmaceutical companies have occupied 0.2-0.3 
percent of the global export market since 2000. Germany is the 
leader on the global pharmaceutical export market with a mar-
ket share of 11.4 percent, followed by the United States (7.8 
percent), China (2.6 percent), and Japan (0.7 percent).
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〔Figure 1-1〕 Changing Nation-by-Nation Shares of the Global Pharmaceutical 
Market
  Source: ISTANS (based upon UN Comtrade data)
From 2000 to 2012, the aggregate amount of R&D investment 
in the Korean pharmaceutical industry multiplied from KRW 
138.1 billion to KRW 1.0445 trillion, but the R&D cost as a 
share of manufacturing only increased from 1.6 to 2.8 percent. 
In comparison, the R&D cost as a share of manufacturing in 
other leading pharmaceutical countries were 22.8 percent in 
the United States (2011), 12.2 percent in Japan, 8.8 percent in 
Germany, and 4.1 percent in China.
Korea China Japan United States German
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〔Figure 1-2〕 R&D Investment in the Korean Pharmaceutical Industry and Its 
Share in Manufacturing
  Source: ISTANS (based upon UN Comtrade data)
Session 3  Direct investment in pharmaceutical
R&D by the Korean government
Both the amount of R&D investment and the size of the re-
search workforce in Korea’s pharmaceutical industry have 
been increasing steadily, yet they are still far from matching 
what is occurring in other advanced countries. As of 2013, a to-
tal of KRW 1.2333 trillion had been investedin the Korean 
pharmaceutical industry, with KRW 258.7 billion comingdir-
ectly from the government. Of the government’s budget for in-
vestmentin R&D, the pharmaceutical industry received 1.6 per-
centin 2014.
KRW 1 billion
R&D cost Share of manufacturing
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〔Figure 1-3〕 Governmental Support for Pharmaceutical R&D and Its Overall 
R&D Budget Share
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The distribution of the government’s R&D support by recipi-
ent type (governmental/public research institutes, universities, 
corporations, and other) reveals that universities were the larg-
est recipient in most years, except for 2006, 2009, and 2013, 
when corporations received the most. In other words, the 
Korean government’s support for pharmaceutical R&D tends to 
be concentrated in universities and corporations, favoring the 
former over the latter.
Unit(KRW 
100 million) Share(%)
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〔Figure 1-4〕 Distribution of Government Support for Pharmaceutical R&D by 
Recipient Type
(Unit: %)
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Governmental support for R&D development has far-reach-
ing effects that are not limited to the receipt of funding. 
Inclusion in the government’s R&D support scheme often 
serves as marker of the quality of a project, which enables re-
searchers involved to receive additional investment from other 
investors with greater ease. Governmental support can also af-
fect and shape corporations’ R&D portfolios. Of course, we 
need a more rigorous economic theory to determine how gov-
ernment R&D investment affects each industry or sector.
Even though the amount of government R&D investment has 
been steadily rising in Korea, many have criticized the re-
dundancy of investments made by multiple departments and 
agencies and the lack of interdepartmental cooperation it 
Governmental/
public research institutes Universities Corporations Other 
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reflects. A more prudent system is needed.  Japan, a country 
with a public R&D support system similar to Korea’s, launched 
a Japanese version of the National Institute of Health (NIH), 
modeled after the American example to oversee Japan’s health-
care system. The new public corporation is meant to centralize 
the budgets, investments, and commercialization processes of 
all health-related R&D projects, which have until recently been 
supported by such Japanese government agencies as the 
Ministry of Culture and Science, the Ministry of Welfare and 
Labor, and the Ministry of Economics and Industries. 
The NIH of the United States and the Medical Research 
Council (MRC) of the United Kingdom are public agencies that 
support R&D. Yet they also operate their own research labs 
and design their own portfolios to guide important R&D 
projects. In developing penicillin, for instance, the MRC formed 
a penicillin committee with representatives of pharmaceutical 
companies and research centers serving as members, and it 
filed patents on the product via that committee. Whereas the 
NIH and the MRC consist of multiple labs, the Japanese version 
has no research functions of its own. The Japanese experiment 
will therefore provide important implications for Korea. 
However, before creating anything akin to Japan’s NIH, it re-
mains to be seen whether Korea’s governmental departments 
and agencies will relinquish their R&D-related privileges and 
powers to such an institution.
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Session 4  Academic-industrial collaboration
The world of health technology is fragmenting at an aston-
ishing pace today, forcing universities and other advanced sci-
entific institutions, hospitals, market organizations, and regu-
latory regimes to enhance their competitiveness. The key to the 
competitiveness of a nation’s health technology lies first and 
foremost in the strength and caliber of its research institutions, 
which, in turn, require an effective education system for the 
teaching and training of researchers. Hospitals should also be 
given incentives to focus more on research activities than 
services. A study which traced back the R&D processes of 32 
pioneering new drugs concluded that the pharmaceutical in-
dustry itself had contributed 53 percent to the drugs’ success; 
universities, 28 percent; hospitals, 13 percent; and govern-
ments, six percent (Maxwell and Eckhardt, 1990). 
Consolietal.(2009) analyze the innovation and spread of medi-
cal technologies as a result of interactions of diverse factors (or 
of innovation systems) that are interdependent of one another.
The factors limiting or promoting the success of academ-
ic-industrial collaboration are relatively clear. According to 
various studies, limiting factors include the disagreement 
among the involved parties over the objectives, the smallness of 
Korean pharmaceutical companies and their pools of experts, 
the lack of accurate valuations of technology, and the in-
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efficiency of the system for distributing rewards of 
collaboration. Promoting factors, on the other hand, include 
strong partnerships, appealing subject areas of R&D, mutual 
respect among the parties involved, and effective incentives.
The Korean government has been implementing its bio-clus-
ter policy in an effort to foster academic-industrial 
collaboration. Since the 2000s, it has invested extensively in 
developing the Osong Bio Valley, the Daegu Bio Valley, and 
other such bio-clusters, with the Osong project alone receiving 
almost KRW 7 trillion. 
Tavassoli and Tsagdis (2013)  have identified 14 factors that 
determine the success or failure of a cluster, two of which are 
the effectiveness of the supporting organization and the focus 
and vision of the organizing committee. The following table 
summarizes more of the common characteristics of leading 
bio-clusters around the world. The most notable characteristic 
common to these bio-clusters is that two top universities—the 
University of Cambridge and the University of Oxford—are at 
their centers. This indicates that the success of an industry 
cluster crucially depends upon both the quality of researchers 
working there and the effectiveness of the re-training system 
the cluster offers. Another key characteristic is that successful 
bio-clusters are centered on corporations. The UK government 
promotes academic-industrial collaboration by supporting the 
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networking among cluster-tenant businesses. The French gov-
ernment requires tenant businesses of clusters to form their 
own councils, so as to make their own decisions on how to im-
prove their clusters. 
〈Table 1-1〉 Key Characteristics of Leading Bio-Clusters Worldwide
Cluster Characteristics
Cambridge
Science
Park (UK)
- Led by Addenbrooke’s Hospital and University of Cambridge.
- Funded systemically by local banks.
- Supports university/research-based entrepreneurship.
Cambridge 
Biomedical 
Campus
(UK)
- Led by Fulbourn Hospital, Rosie Hospital, Addenbrooke’s 
Hospital, Papworth Hospital, Cambridge Department of 
Medicine, MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology, Cancer 
Research UK Cambridge Institute, and other renowned hospitals 
and research   institutes.
- Fosters networking among tenant institutes with a support 
system.
- Provides a system for re-training and recruiting researchers.
- Cluster has its own re-investment process.
Oxfordshire
Bio Cluste
(UK)
- Led by Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, QinetiQ Nanomaterials 
Limited, and University of Oxford.
- Fosters networking among universities, research labs, and tenant 
businesses with a business-centered and bottom-up R&D 
support system.
- Provides an integrated system supporting the entire process 
from R&D to production.
Lyonbiopole
(France)
- Provides a decision-making body in which tenant businesses, 
research labs, and local governments participate.
- Supports a business-led cluster association.
Medicen
Paris
(France)
- Tenant businesses, research labs, universities, and local 
governments can decide cluster’s policies in a bottom-up 
manner.
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Session 5  Insurance benefits and pricing
The health insurance system plays a decisive role in the in-
novation and spread of health technology in a given society. A 
new health technology might be developed, but it may never be 
commercialized as a product or service if investors perceive the 
future prospects of the technology to be uncertain. Therefore, 
the coverage, the extent, and the cost of insurance-covered 
health products or services play a central role in deciding the 
pace at which new health technologies (e.g., stem cell technol-
ogy, genetic treatments, and the like) spread. That is why poli-
cymakers must revisit the current system of evaluating health 
technology and the governance of insurance benefits to consid-
er ways of improving the efficiency and accuracy of the tech-
nology valuation process.
In Korea, a new drug is only included in health insurance 
coverage after the Health Insurance Review and Assessment 
Service (HIRA)’s Drug Benefits Evaluation Committee decides 
on its appropriateness for the health insurance scheme. Once 
the drug is deemed appropriate, the National Health Insurance 
Service (NHIS) launches negotiations with the pharmaceutical 
company over the price of the drug. The Drug Benefits 
Evaluation Committee determines whether a new drug is ap-
propriate for insurance coverage on the basis of the relative 
clinical utility the drug offers over previous drugs, its cost-ef-
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fectiveness, and its possible impact on the fiscal system. 
Clinically useful and cost-effective new drugs are admitted into 
the insurance coverage scheme based on coverage by health 
insurers elsewhere around the world, the coverage price and 
benefits ratio, and the fiscal resources available for insurance 
benefits. Drugs that have no alternatives, that treat small 
groups of patients suffering from fatal and rare diseases, and 
that have shown clinical benefits (e.g., significant extension in 
life expectancy) may be included into the insurance coverage 
scheme without proof of cost-effectiveness.
Since December 2006, Korean law has required that all new 
drugs be registered (included into the health insurance cover-
age scheme) based on selective review and economic analyses. 
Economic analyses involve determining the cost-effectiveness 
of new drugs and presenting the results in the form of in-
cremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). The ICER is a 
measure of how much a unit of a given drug improves its effect 
per cost. The cost estimation process involves listing the ap-
propriate items of expenses associated with a treatment based 
on the given drug; measuring the amounts of resources spent 
on the given items in natural units (e.g., the number of hospi-
talization days required and the number of hospital visits re-
quired); and multiplying the amount of resources spent under 
each item by the unit cost to estimate the final cost. In general, 
these analyses use the quality-adjusted-life-years (QALY) as an 
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indicator of cost-effectiveness but do not recognize techno-
logical or pharmacological innovation as meaningful 
indicators. In other words, the current health insurance review 
system’s focus is largely on the improvement of clinical effect. 
An innovative new drug is unlikely to be included into the 
health insurance scheme based only on the innovation it has 
made possible in the treatment/administration process. In the 
future, however, the review system will have to account for 
technological or pharmacological innovation as well.
The price of a drug reflects the cost of the R&D process to 
bring a final product to market and determines the profit ex-
pectations of the pharmaceutical company involved. In most 
industrialized societies, the pharmaceutical market is subject to 
the health insurance system, as this system determines the pri-
ces of drugs. Increasing drug prices may lead corporations to 
invest more in R&D by allowing them to earn greater profits. 
However, macroscopic observations and analyses of the corre-
lation between the pricing policy and the pharmaceutical R&D 
activities in Korea over the last few decades reveal that this 
correlation has not always been positive or proportional. If 
anything, the contents of the pricing policy rather than the ab-
solute pricing level may exert a greater impact on R&D 
activities. To date, no empirical study has been conducted in 
Korea to demonstrate the correlation between the pricing poli-
cy/level and the R&D productivity of pharmaceutical 
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companies. Korean pharmaceutical companies differ sig-
nificantly from their multinational counterparts in terms of the 
scope and scale of R&D. It is therefore difficult to apply the 
conclusions of empirical studies on the R&D activities of these 
multinational counterparts directly to Korea’s situation. As a 
consequence, stimulating pharmaceutical R&D in Korea in the 
future will require support for empirical studies on how pricing 
policy actually affects Korean companies’ R&D activities.
Session 6  Conclusion 
Given the need to ensure and improve public health in 
changing times, it is critical to understand how innovations and 
progresses occur in the pharmaceutical industry. The pharma-
ceutical market is expected to achieve exponential growth 
worldwide in the coming years. Promoting innovation in the 
Korean pharmaceutical industry will therefore significantly 
benefit the national economy. Numerous governments world-
wide have already launched diverse policies that explicitly or 
implicitly support the pharmaceutical industries in their re-
spective territories. 
The United Kingdom provides an example of a successful 
and effective policy for fostering a nation’s pharmaceutical 
industry. Its pharmaceutical industry is experiencing new 
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growth, thanks to advancements in information technology, 
engineering, and genetics. Yet the productivity of its R&D has 
been on a steady decline, just as it has elsewhere around the 
world. In response to this paradox, the UK government an-
nounced its Strategy for UK Life Sciences in December 2011, a 
strategy for the development of the country’s life sciences over 
the course of the next decade with innovation led by the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). The strat-
egy envisions the UK as becoming a global leader in life scien-
ces and maps out specific steps that will be taken toward that 
goal1). 
Naturally, as pharmaceutical innovation is complex, in-
centive driven, and involves R&D efforts from both the public 
and private sectors, outcomes differ from nation to nation. 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical innovation and policies remain 
under-analyzed topics in the research community. This may be 
because innovation in healthcare tends to be varied and 
1) According to the strategy, the UK government will play a leading role in 
raising a Biomedical Catalyst Fund for academic-industrial collaboration, 
developing the National Biologics Manufacturing Centre (NBMC), and creating 
the “Cell Therapy Catapult.” The UK government has also launched a policy 
for enhancing patients’ access to latest-technology medicines and increasing 
opportunities for them to participate in clinical trials; and it distributes 
clinical test data, on the condition of the anonymity of test subjects, for the 
purposes of drug development and research (Clinical Practice Research 
Datalink, CPRD). As part of its efforts to encourage medical institutions to 
adopt the latest innovations, the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) actively publicizes and advertises information on new 
technologies, while the government encourages academic-industrial 
collaboration groups to adopt innovations by removing all possible obstacles.
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sweeping in scope. I have addressed four areas to be consid-
ered in the policy perspective; 1) Direct investment in pharma-
ceutical R&D by the government, 2) Academic-industrial col-
laboration, 3) Insurance benefits and pricing. 
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Session 1  Introduction
Knowledge and innovation have long been recognized as 
critical to economic growth. Particularly for developed econo-
mies, which no longer have a competitive advantge in manu-
facturing due to high wages, sectors that rely on intangibles 
like knowledge have increased in importance. Can government 
policy promote innovation, and under what conditions? 
Focusing on the particular case of pharmaceutical innovation, 
this chapter summarizes the economic case for innovation pol-
icy, describes how inovation policy is implemented in practice, 
and describes the evidence on the effects of innovation policy.
The economic justification for a government role in promot-
ing innovation is to ameliorate a particular type of market fail-
ure associated with the production of knowledge and 
innovation. Specifically, ideas and knowledge are non-rivalrous 
(or public) goods. A pastry, for example, is a rivalrous good: if 
one person consumes the pastry, no one else can enjoy it. 
However, the recipe used to create the pastry is non-rivalrous. 
Its use by one chef does not preclude its use by other chefs. It 
R&D Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Innovation
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is, in fact, a public good. Not only can other chefs use it, but 
they might develop new recipes by modifying this one, yielding 
even better desserts; economists refer to this as cumulative 
innovation. The non-rivalrous nature of knowledge and the po-
tential for spillovers imply large benefits for society.
Unfortunately, knowledge can be costly to produce. 
Returning to the example of a pastry, the creation of a new 
recipe may require substantial investment in specialized train-
ing and equipment. Because many attempts to create a new 
pastry yield nothing useful, this investment can be risky. Any 
chef contemplating this investment weighs these costs against 
the potential benefits. But rather than considering the total 
benefits realized by himself as well as all other chefs, who 
might produce the same pastry and develop new recipes based 
on this one, the chef considers only the profits he might realize 
himself. Another way of describing this problem is that the in-
ventor, or producer of knowledge, cannot appropriate all of 
the benefits because of its non-rivalrous nature. This calcu-
lation means that he will invest far less in finding new pastries 
than the social optimum. Paradoxically, the fact that knowl-
edge can be easily used by many can result in insufficient in-
vestment in its production.
In order to prevent spillovers, the inventor may attempt to 
keep his innovation secret (or at least the means of producing 
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the innovation). Secrecy is a means of appropriating the bene-
fits, but also reduces the social benefits. In addition, if the in-
ventor wanted to sell the information, he would face the dis-
closure problem, or Arrow’s information paradox. Because few 
buyers would be willing to purchase the information without 
some proof of its quality, the inventor is forced to disclose 
some details in order to guarantee that the information has 
value. But once disclosed, the price of the information is zero. 
Information is non-rivalrous, so the inventor can’t take it back 
from the buyer; since the buyer has the information already, he 
may feel no obligation to pay for it. Technology transfer may 
be impeded.
The production of ideas, information, or knowledge is there-
fore difficult to manage. The greater the spillovers, which are 
social benefits, the lower is the investment by for-profit organ-
izations and the less likely is technology transfer or sharing of 
knowledge. Innovation policy seeks to correct this market 
failure.
Session 2  Push and pull policies
Broadly speaking, innovation policy may be classified into 
two approaches. “Pull” policies aim to increase the private 
benefits associated with innovation. “Push” policies instead tar-
34 Korean pharmaceutical industry policy: Lessons for Korea
get the costs. In both cases, the assumption is that innovators 
will respond by increasing their innovative efforts, and the total 
level of innovative efforts will be closer to the social optimum.
Before describing these in more detail, it is important to re-
alize that while the social returns from innovation may be 
large, they are not infinite. More is not always better, once 
costs are considered. Few would argue that it makes sense to 
spend trillions to develop a new pastry. As delicious as it might 
be, that money is likely to be more usefully deployed 
elsewhere. Social welfare is maximized when the additional ex-
pected benefits resulting from investment are equal to their 
costs. Innovative efforts with a small probability of success are 
justified only if the benefits are very large. For a given benefit, 
we should spend more where success is more likely.
Because the benefits from innovation are considerably hard-
er to quantify systematically than are the costs, policy debate 
often focuses mostly on the latter. For example, a factor in 
rankings of countries in terms of their innovative capacity by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and others is the percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) spent on research and development (R&D) (OECD 
(2014)). Implicitly, these rankings assume that the socially opti-
mal percentage exceeds what we observe in practice. However, 
we do not have particularly reliable estimates of the socially 
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optimal level. This almost surely varies across industries and 
over time.
  2.1 Pull policies
The most widely used pull policy around the world today is 
the granting of intellectual property rights, particularly patents. 
Patents allow an inventor to prevent others from manufacturing 
a good based on his idea for a limited period of time. During 
that period, the knowledge underlying the invention is less 
non-rivalrous, in some sense. Consequently, the inventor is 
able to appropriate a greater share of the benefits resulting 
from his efforts.
Patents have a number of appealing features as a policy 
instrument. First, they do not require a policymaker (or govern-
ment agency, or expert committee) to measure the benefits 
from a potential innovation. Rather, inventors form estimates 
of their expected profits, and invest accordingly. Under some 
conditions, markets can efficiently aggregate disperse in-
formation; patents are one means of using markets to acquire 
information about the value of an invention. If inventor profits 
are correlated with social benefits, then the signals provided by 
the market induce investment that targets appropriate goals. 
Note that this link is essential, and is not guaranteed. However, 
the preponderance of evidence shows that patents are linked to 
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increased investment in pharmaceutical development, on aver-
age (see, among others, Qian (2007), Kyle & McGahan (2012)).
Second, patents require some disclosure by the inventor. For 
example, a granted patent generally must include sufficient de-
tail about the invention so that an expert in the field would be 
able to understand it. In most countries, patent applications 
are published after 18 months. While it may be incomplete, 
disclosure allows spillovers of knowledge to others. In contrast, 
trade secrets, another mechanism by which inventors may at-
tempt to protect their profits, do not provide these spillovers. 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, secrecy is limited due to other 
regulations to assure the quality of manufacturing. Numerous 
studies have established that patents generate important spill-
overs through disclosure (Jaffe (1986), for example).
Third, patents appear inexpensive to many politicians.2) 
Other than the direct costs of running a patent office, they re-
quire no budgetary outlays. Of course, patents are costly in 
other senses, discussed below.
Fourth, patents are relatively strong policy commitments. 
Particularly in recent decades, trade agreements require sig-
natory countries to provide minimum patent terms and to en-
2) This is not usually the case in developing countries, where politicians are 
more likely to view patents as benefitting foreign inventors at the expense of 
the local population.
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force them. Consequently, inventors are mostly shielded from 
variations in policies from year to year, which introduce un-
certainty and complicate investment.
Fifth, patents reduce the disclosure problem through estab-
lishing property rights around knowledge. These property 
rights enable inventors to sell their ideas directly, and to profit 
even if he does not engage in manufacturing or production on 
the downstream market. The development of a “market for 
ideas” or market for technology enables vertical specialization. 
Different actors in the market can focus primarily on the activ-
ities in which they are strong, whether that is R&D, manu-
facturing, marketing, etc. This can yield a lower total cost of 
innovation. In fact, the pharmaceutical industry is now charac-
terized by this vertical specialization. Small biotechnology firms 
focus on early-stage research, and license their products to 
larger firms with global sales forces. In recent years, the num-
ber of new pharmaceutical treatments that originated in small-
er firms and were licensed to multinationals has continued to 
increase, evidence of the importance of these licensing markets 
(Economist (2006)).
Unfortunately, the long-run dynamic efficiency (incentives 
for innovation that contributes to welfare over time) yielded by 
patents comes at the cost of short-run static costs. Because 
patents grant market power to an inventor, the inventor may 
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sell at a price higher than would be the case with competition. 
Consequently, access to the innovation may be reduced, be-
cause some consumers may not be willing to pay that higher 
price. This trade-off is particularly acute in the case of phar-
maceutical treatments. In the short run, some patients may die 
because they cannot afford access to patented treatments. 
Consequently, other policies to counteract these less desirable 
aspects of patents are often employed, such as pharmaceutical 
price controls.
Patents have other shortcomings as well. They are rather 
blunt policy instruments, applying a “one-size-fits-all” term of 
20 years of protection regardless of technology field or the im-
portance of an invention that meets the minimum criteria for 
patentability. Products with long development times, such as 
pharmaceuticals, receive the same duration of protection as 
those with much more rapid lifecycles, such as computers or 
mobile phones. Since the period of protection begins from the 
patent application date, rather than the date at which a prod-
uct based on that patent reaches the market, the effective peri-
od of protection can be much shorter than 20 years. Recent re-
search (Budish et al. (2013)) has demonstrated that this varia-
tion in effective patent life may distort innovative efforts in 
pharmaceuticals, in particular away from products with longer 
development periods (and therefore with less time remaining 
on patent, once marketed). Other more flexible policy instru-
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ments may complement patents, such as patent extensions (to 
offset time lost in development) or market exclusivity periods 
(which date from product launch, rather than invention).
In addition, the link between profits and social value does 
not always exist. For example, diseases that primarily affect 
those living in developing countries, such as malaria, have long 
been neglected by for-profit firms. While the social value of 
curing malaria is high, the profit potential is low, even in the 
presence of patents, because patients are unable to pay prices 
that would allow a firm to recover the fixed costs of 
development. Kyle & McGahan (2012) found that while increas-
ing patent protection stimulated research efforts for global dis-
eases, it was not sufficient for attracting research on diseases 
that primarily affect poor countries. Vaccines for infectious 
diseases are another example. An individual who takes a vac-
cine benefits not only himself, but all with whom he might 
come into contact. Since individuals are likely to ignore the 
benefits to others, demand for vaccines is lower than what is 
socially optimal. Consequently, investment in vaccine develop-
ment may also be too low. Finally, other government policies 
such as price controls can distort the relationship between 
profits and social value. For drugs that treat very important dis-
eases that affect a large number of people, governments may 
be tempted to set relatively low prices in order to maximize 
access. However, that may depress the profits associated with 
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socially valuable treatments and distort research incentives.
In the extensive (mostly theoretical) literature on the econom-
ics of patents, it is generally accepted that patents do not pro-
vide optimal incentives. Alternatives to patents include govern-
ment-sponsored prizes for innovation or ex ante commitments 
to purchase a minimum quantity at a specified price. Kremer & 
Glennerster (2004) proposes these policy instruments for ad-
dressing neglected diseases, in particular. These tools explicitly 
consider the link between profits and social value, and they 
avoid the short-run static inefficiencies of patents. However, 
they can be difficult to implement in practice. They require an 
estimate of social value, which may be difficult. They may re-
quire coordination among multiple funders, and the commit-
ment must be credible. Wright (1983) provides a useful summary 
of several pull policy alternatives: patents, prizes, and research 
contracts. He emphasizes that in environments with asym-
metrical information about the costs of performing R&D and its 
value, patents may be preferable to prizes. Because of the lim-
ited use of prizes to date, we have little empirical evidence on 
their efficacy in pharmaceutical development3). However, there 
has been growing interest in expanding their use.4)
3) Only one advanced market commitment has been implemented, for the 
pneumococcus vaccine. Brunt et al. (2012) examine inducement prizes in 
agriculture from 1839-1939 and find large effects.
4) See Stine (2009) for a summary of federally funded prizes in the US. 
Democratic presidential candidate Senator Bernie Sanders proposed a 
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In a global market, R&D investment will only respond to pull 
policies that create a large shift in expected global revenues. Few 
countries have sufficient importance to implement such policies. 
For example, if a small country were to double (or halve) the pe-
riod of patent protection, it would be very surprising to observe a 
response in the R&D efforts of private firms. If it accounts for 
only 2% of the global market, and almost no pull policy in-
troduced by this country alone would make a difference. In fact, 
all countries for which this is true (including large but poor 
countries, which account for only a small share of total pharma-
ceutical revenues) have reason to maximize access in the short 
run and to ignore the dynamic incentives for innovation. For this 
reason, foreign free-riding on the incentives created by US pull 
policies is a complaint often heard in Washington. For example, 
former FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan noted “Americans, 
who account for a fraction of prescription drug use worldwide, 
will pay for about half of all pharmaceutical spending worldwide. 
By contrast, citizens in the world’s third largest economy, 
Germany, paid less than five percent. The same kind of drug pay-
ment disparity is true for many other developed nations who have 
about as much ability to pay as Americans do...The United States 
is now covering most of these costs of developing a new drug to 
the point where it can be used by the population of the world.”5)
“Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act” in 2011, though the Senate never voted 
on it.
5) http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm053614.htm
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International trade agreements that include intellectual 
property rights can at least partially address this issue. They 
commit countries to minimum patent terms, which may reduce 
free-riding. In aggregate, if all small countries coordinate on 
patent policy (or another pull policy, such as prizes), the dy-
namic incentives for investment should be higher. In practice, 
this coordination has been extremely controversial in the case 
of patents, although the result of a series of multilateral and bi-
lateral trade agreements has been an increase in the length and 
breadth of patents on pharmaceuticals in many countries.
  2.2 Push policies
Rather than changing expected revenues in order to induce 
supply, push policies encourage greater investment in R&D by 
reducing the costs of that investment. Such policies include tax 
credits for R&D investment, grants for research performed in 
universities or other organizations, and the establishment of 
government research centers that perform research internally. 
Most governments in developed countries employ some mix of 
these.
If the government requires that the results of funded research 
are placed in the public domain or made available through 
low-cost non-exclusive licensing, the resulting knowledge po-
tentially generates greater spillovers. No intellectual property 
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blocks its use, and the information is disclosed through pub-
lications or other means. For example, the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) in the United States typically ask that recipients 
of grants publish the results in open access journals in order to 
maximize the availability of the knowledge. In addition, the 
static losses associated with patents and market power can be 
avoided. The production of a successful treatment can be li-
censed to many firms, ensuring competition and reducing 
prices.
Like prizes, push policies rely less on market signals of social 
value to drive investment than the use of patents. Particularly 
in situations in which profits are not linked to social value, this 
“de-linking” is appropriate. A number of scholars affiliated 
with non-governmental organizations working in global health 
have advocated such a model (Love (2011)). Relatedly, another 
advantage of some push policies (and prizes) relative to patents 
is their responsiveness to social need. The size of the cost re-
duction can be adjusted to reflect the relative importance of 
the research, while the patent term is fixed.
Push policies have a number of weaknesses, however. First, 
the information burden for a policymaker is considerably high-
er than for pull policies. Not only must a policymaker have an 
estimate of the social value associated with the R&D, but the 
policymaker must also be able to identify the most capable 
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performer of that R&D. For example, is a government agency 
more likely to succeed, or to succeed at a lower cost, than a 
forprofit organization? The former faces little competition, 
while the market may punish poor performance of a firm. If the 
government chooses instead to fund research performed in 
universities, how does it select the best researcher? The cost of 
acquiring the information necessary for selection may be sig-
nificant, and failure to do so may result in inefficient funding of 
unproductive researchers. When grants are restricted to do-
mestic researchers, the capacity for “crowdsourcing” research 
is also reduced.
Push policies also require policymakers to confront potential 
moral hazard on the part of grant recipients. In order to ensure 
that recipients spend grant money efficiently, funders typically 
stagger the financing over several years and condition it on evi-
dence of successful efforts. However, an academic researcher 
may be reluctant to disclose the failure of his research efforts, 
particularly if doing so means losing the grant. In addition, 
placing restrictions on how grant money may be used in order 
to avoid wasteful spending may limit the flexibility to address 
changes in need. For example, the cost of laboratory equip-
ment may suddenly fall, but if the recipient is prevented from 
reallocating any savings towards another use, he may never-
theless buy additional unnecessary materials. Kremer (2002) 
points to the example of a program funded by the US Agency 
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for International Development in the 1980s, in which some 
funding recipients defrauded the government. These problems 
are also present in for-profit research, of course, but econo-
mists usually have faith in the market to address them more 
easily than government.
Research is fundamentally risky, and failure is common. Push 
policies therefore require some tolerance for failure on the 
part of the government (and the electorate). Because push 
funding may be sensitive to the electoral cycle or changes in 
political leadership, it may be unreliable. For example, during a 
period of economic downturn and tightened budgets, it may be 
tempting to cut investment in research that has not produced 
tangible, obvious and important results. In contrast, the effi-
cacy of pull policies depends to some extent on the develop-
ment of capital markets and investors’ willingness to finance 
risky development efforts. The risk under both patents and 
prizes is borne by these investors, rather than by the govern-
ment or policymaker.
Under some conditions, pull and push policies can be de-
signed to achieve identical expected outcomes at the same ex-
pected costs. In practice, pull policies are more attractive in 
situations where the information burden is particularly large, 
where capital markets function well, and where government 
funders are risk averse. Push policies are favored when the 
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promotion of spillovers is especially important and if capital 
markets undervalue R&D.
Session 3  Government funding of R&D in
pharmaceuticals
In this section, I will focus exclusively on the use of push pol-
icies, primarily grants, to fund R&D efforts in drug 
development. Although important, I will abstract away from 
most details of grants, such as their optimal scope, length, etc. 
and instead consider only their objective: to advance drug de-
velopment in a particular disease. I begin with a discussion of 
economic models of how best to allocate funding across dis-
eases and their shortcomings. I then provide an overview of 
empirical studies in this area.
  3.1 Theory
A simple model of government funding is presented in 
Lichtenberg (2001). This model is based on the premise that 
government allocates research funding in order to maximize 
social welfare, and that the probability of curing a disease is an 
increasing function of funding: the greater the funding, the 
more likely it is that research will generate a cure. The level of 
funding for each disease that maximizes social welfare is such 
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that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost, subject 
to a budget constraint. The model predicts that funding should 
be greater for diseases with more serious burdens, and for dis-
eases where scientific productivity is higher. These predictions 
are also consistent with NIH descriptions of the funding 
process.
While very appealing in its simplicity and predictions, the 
model considers only a single country and its government or 
social planner. For a very large country such as the United 
States, or in a world in which countries are quite isolated from 
each other, this is not an unreasonable approach. However, 
national economies are now much more tightly linked together. 
Diseases do not respect national boundaries, and nor does in-
formation about how best to treat them. The large sunk costs 
associated with drug development are usually amortized over 
sales in many countries by large, multinational pharmaceutical 
firms.
If each national government considers only its local disease 
burden and local scientific productivity, inefficient allocation 
of funding is a likely outcome. First, each government under-
estimates the total benefit of curing a disease, because it ig-
nores the spillovers to other countries. For example, the bur-
den of malaria in the United States is very small; this model 
would suggest that the US NIH spend very little money on ma-
48 Korean pharmaceutical industry policy: Lessons for Korea
laria research. In fact, the global burden is large, and countries 
where the local burden is high may face more severe budget 
constraints, as they are generally poorer. Second, if funding is 
allocated only to local scientists, there also a potential loss of 
efficiency in countries where local science is less productive. If 
there are economies of scale in R&D, then small countries may 
be unable to match the productivity of research programs in 
larger countries with higher levels of funding. In other words, 
the outcome achieved by many individual countries is probably 
inferior to that obtained by a single social planner taking global 
decisions.
Indeed, this model is especially problematic for small 
countries. Just as pull policies are unlikely to shift incentives, 
their research funding may also be insignificant compared to 
global spending. Often, policies that appear to have an effect 
do so only at a local level, rather than a global one. For exam-
ple, generous tax credits for R&D may induce firms to relocate 
their laboratories, but not to shift the level of their research 
activities.
Perhaps each national government instead recognizes that 
diseases affect people in other countries and that the benefits 
of research can be shared globally. Unfortunately, rather than 
improving the situation, this recognition may lead to free-rid-
ing on the research supported by other governments. For ex-
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ample, if the NIH considers the global malaria burden and allo-
cates additional funding for malaria research, it is possible that 
all other government funders reduce their own spending on 
malaria. In this sense, countries behave as in an alliance for 
defense, such as NATO. Since deterrence of a shared enemy’s 
aggression is a public good among alliance members, each is 
able to free-ride on the defense budgets of their allies (Olson & 
Zeckhauser (1966)).
A separate concern is that this model neglects the behavior 
of the forprofit sector. It is sometimes argued that health is too 
important to be left to private firms CITE, and that govern-
ments should instead finance or perform all pharmaceutical 
R&D. Proponents of this approach point to two advantages. 
Governments focus on burden instead of profits, and distribute 
the resulting treatments in order to maximize access, rather 
than profits. If profits (made possible by patents, for example) 
are higher for diseases with greater burdens, then firms would 
also choose to spend more R&D money on severe diseases, for 
a given level of scientific productivity. Indeed, a multinational 
firm would consider the global burden, not just a local burden, 
and would also have the capacity to tap into scientific talent 
around the world. This could mean a more efficient allocation 
of R&D, with a temporary reduction in access associated with 
patents.
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Of course, as discussed previously, it is easy to identify ex-
amples of diseases with high burdens but low profits, which the 
private sector is likely to ignore. It is precisely these diseases 
where the case for government funding is strongest. In fact, 
there exists a risk of crowding out private investment in dis-
eases with high profit potential.
  3.2 Empirical evidence
Many researchers have empirically examined government 
funding of pharmaceutical R&D. This interest reflects in part its 
budgetary importance (the NIH budget alone exceeded $US30 
billion in 2015, for example), as well as the availability of good 
measures of output or results.6) These studies consider several 
different questions, discussed below.
Despite my emphasis on the importance of considering a 
global market above, most studies use data from a single coun-
try, most often the US. Given the outsize importance of the US 
in funding medical research, this is not surprising. However, it 
may limit the applicability of some of the conclusions to other 
countries.
6) Governments fund research in many other fields as well, but pharmaceutical 
research generates countable outputs such as the number of new chemical 
entities and is unlikely to be kept secret for national security reasons.
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1) Political economy of funding decisions
Motivated by the model of funding allocations described 
above, Lichtenberg (2001) estimates the determinants of NIH 
funding across diseases using data on grants from 1971-1995. 
Lacking a good measure of scientific productivity at the disease 
level, the main focus of his work is disease burden. He finds a 
positive relationship between the level of disease funding and 
measures of disease burden, such as life years lost before age 
65. While this is encouraging evidence that the NIH behaves in 
a way consistent with societal interest, Lichtenberg also pres-
ents some nuanced results on whether this relationship varies 
with the demographics of disease. Specifically, he finds that 
diseases that are relatively more prevalent among the 
non-white population receive less funding. While many factors 
could explain this pattern – in particular, scientific knowledge 
about such diseases may be lower, so funding is less productive 
– they do suggest the possibility that the political economy of 
funding decisions may be important.
Subsequent studies have indeed uncovered evidence of polit-
ical influence at the NIH. Hegde (2009) examines how members 
of the US Congress may sway NIH grant allocations. While the 
main role of Congress is to decide the total NIH budget, repre-
sentatives often “earmark” money for specific diseases. Hegde’s 
analysis suggests that these earmarks favor potential grant re-
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cipients in the representative’s home district. For example, a 
representative whose district includes a university with a strong 
research program in infectious diseases is more likely to ear-
mark NIH funds for infectious diseases, thus favoring the 
university. Hegde & Sampat (2015) study the role of lobbying by 
patient advocacy groups. They find that lobbying results in 
Congressional earmarks for diseases as well. It is possible that 
lobbying is related to the burden of disease, so that the most 
important diseases also have the highest levels of lobbying. It is 
also possible that earmarks favor the most productive 
universities. However, these two papers highlight the risk that 
governments do not always maximize social welfare in practice.
As noted above, the informational burden associated with 
push funding is quite high. Aside from the difficulty in de-
termining the most deserving diseases, a funder must also se-
lect the most deserving recipients for performing the research. 
For the latter, the NIH uses expert committees to evaluate grant 
applications. These experts provide a numerical assessment of 
each application, and the NIH funds applications in order of 
this assessment up to its budget constraint. Several recent stud-
ies have closely examined this process. CITE Li:2015 considers 
the potential for biased experts. The grant reviewers may favor 
applications closely related to their own research; after all, they 
are more likely to find the questions interesting. Li:2015 shows 
that “proximity” of an expert reviewer to the application is as-
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sociated with more positive assessments. However, she also 
finds that the informational advantage of experts outweighs 
this bias. Ginther & et al. (2011), who focus specifically on how 
race and ethnicity are related to the probability of receiving 
NIH funding, found large and statistically significant differ-
ences for non-white applicants, even after controlling for 
measures of applicant quality.
These results may not apply to other countries or to agen-
cies’ practices, of course. Indeed, there is much to learn from 
experiences in other countries in designing effective funding 
models. I merely want to illustrate that even in an environment 
where decisions are relatively transparent and data is widely 
available, the empirical reality may deviate in important ways 
from the theoretical ideal of government R&D support.
2) Effect of grants
While the papers described in the previous subsection ana-
lyze factors that affect the level of government support, anoth-
er strand of the literature examines the effects of this support. 
Also for reasons of data availability, most studies on the effect 
of government R&D have also focused on biomedical research 
and on the US.
Survey evidence of firms points to a clear link between gov-
54 Korean pharmaceutical industry policy: Lessons for Korea
ernment funding, especially of basic research, and private sec-
tor investments (see CITE Mansfield 1998 and Cohen et al. 
(2002)). The relationship between the two was reported to be 
strongest for pharmaceuticals in both studies. CITE 
Cockburn1998, in an econometric study of pharmaceutical firm 
productivity, also identified the importance of public sector re-
search: firms that were more connected to this research had 
better performance.
Many other academic papers have found a positive relation-
ship between NIH funding of disease-specific research and pri-
vate sector pharmaceutical R&D. Two examples are Toole 
(2007) and Blume-Kohout (2012). Both examine NIH spending 
by disease and its relationship to either the number of drug de-
velopment projects entering clinical trials or the number of 
new drugs developed. The private sector increase is observed 
several years after public sector spending, which is consistent 
with the idea that public funding of basic research generates 
knowledge that takes some time to diffuse.
While these papers begin with data on R&D funding and look 
at outcomes, another approach to estimating the importance 
of public funding is to study whether successful outcomes are 
linked to public support. CITE Stevens2011 identify 153 drugs 
approved by the FDA that had origins in public sector research 
institutions. Similarly, Sampat & Lichtenberg (2011) find that 
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government funding at least indirectly contributed to about half 
of new drugs approved, and to an even greater share of those 
identified by the FDA as “priority” drugs.
The key challenge in identifying the effect of funding is the 
difficulty in finding an “experiment” to study. Funding is not 
randomly assigned, either to targets of research or to 
recipients. If governments generally fund the most promising 
science and the most capable researchers, we might over-
estimate the effects of government support simply because of 
the high probability of useful results even in the absence of this 
funding. On the other hand, if governments instead try to fund 
science that poses the greatest challenges, or funds politically 
connected (but less productive) researchers, we might under-
estimate the true effects of government support. The size and 
direction of the bias depends critically on how funding is 
allocated.
To address this bias, Jacob & Lefgren (2011) and Azoulay et 
al. (2015) link NIH grants to output measures using exogenous 
variation in grants that results from funding rules. Specifically, 
the NIH assigns scores to grant applications, and funds grants 
in order of these scores until the budget is exhausted. The 
“cutoff” for funding varies for reasons that are independent of 
the quality of grant applications, so the researchers can com-
pare applications that were just above this cutoff to those just 
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below. Jacob & Lefgren (2011) focus on the research pro-
ductivity of the researcher who was directly funded, and con-
clude that NIH funding results in no increase in scientific pub-
lications authored by that individual on average. They suggest 
that researchers can easily find alternative funding if rejected 
by the NIH, so the implication is not that funding makes no dif-
ference, but rather that the source of funding may be 
unimportant. In contrast, Azoulay et al. (2015) use private sec-
toring patenting as their output measure. They find an increase 
of 2.3 patents per $10 million of NIH funding.
Even if we can identify a causal positive relationship between 
NIH funding and private sector output, determining whether 
push funding is efficient remains difficult. To do so, we require 
a measure of benefits, such as years of life saved or improve-
ments in the quality of life. While estimates of these exist, these 
must be linked to a specific treatment, and then the specific 
treatment must be linked to government-supported research. 
At the same time, it is necessary for all other factors that might 
be important. These include changes in pull policies as well as 
push policies in other countries, which are very rarely consid-
ered in academic studies.
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3) Evidence of crowd-out and free-riding
As noted previously, government grants may risk crowding 
out private investment. If government budgets fund research 
that would have been financed by the private sector in any 
case, then it is less likely that the policy is addressing a market 
failure that leads to underinvestment, and the possibility of 
competing with government research may further deter private 
investors. A second potential issue is that of free-riding by for-
eign governments. Because the knowledge generated by re-
search can be used across borders, it is tempting to let other 
countries finance the production of that knowledge and enjoy 
the benefits without paying.
Goolsbee (1998) studies the extent of crowding out in R&D 
funding. He argues that salaries of scientists and other R&D 
workers comprise the bulk of R&D spending, and that the supply 
of these scientists and engineers is inelastic because of the years 
of study required to achieve competency in these fields. This im-
plies that when R&D spending increases, salaries of existing sci-
entists are likely to rise. Since the private sector competes with 
universities and other public research institutions for scientific 
talent, this has the effect of raising R&D costs for firms. Even if 
private spending on R&D did not change as a result, the pro-
ductivity of that spending would decrease. In this sense, Goolsbee 
(1998) finds that government crowding out is significant.
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In the specific case of pharmaceuticals, most empirical evi-
dence (cited in the previous section) suggests that public fund-
ing is associated with an increase in private investment, rather 
than crowding out. Perhaps the supply of medical researchers 
is more elastic, or government funding focuses on basic re-
search or open science to a greater extent than in other fields. 
Certainly, a better understanding of specific policy features is 
needed.
The globalization of R&D may also have reduced the risk of 
crowding out. While the local supply of scientists may be in-
elastic, an increase in salaries driven by government R&D 
spending may induce firms to relocate some of their research 
activities to countries where there is a large, untapped supply. 
Of course, this is probably not the intention of R&D policy, and 
there may still be a loss in R&D productivity associated with 
this relocation.
If globalization has diminished crowding out, though, it has 
probably increased the temptation to free-ride on research 
funded by foreign governments. There are many studies on 
free-riding in strategic defense alliances, and this is an espe-
cially active area for policies concerning reduction of emis-
sions and greenhouse gases. Trade agreements that include 
minimum requirements for intellectual property protection do 
so (at least in part) to restrict free-riding on the incentives cre-
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ated by patent rights in foreign markets. However, few have 
examined whether free-riding occurs in R&D push policy.
In ongoing work, Kyle et al. (2015) study government (and 
non-profit foundation) support of infectious and parasitic dis-
ease research. We argue that these “neglected” diseases have 
minimal risk of crowding out, since they have historically been 
unsuccessful at attracting private investment. Countries where 
the burden is highest are generally poor, and their governments 
are unable to provide substantial support for R&D. Therefore, 
countries like the US, which provides more than half of the to-
tal R&D support, are providing a public good in financing this 
research. We find that when the US increases its total spending 
on these diseases, there is little response in the total spending 
by other governments. However, at the disease level, an in-
crease by the US seems to induce a reallocation of other fun-
ders, who reduce their funding of that disease but increase 
funding of other infectious or parasitic diseases. These are 
merely preliminary findings, and much additional study – par-
ticularly of a larger set of diseases – is necessary.
Session 4  Conclusion
In my view, traditional R&D policies in pharmaceuticals 
should be reconsidered. Globalization and increased interna-
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tional trade have made single country models inappropriate, 
particularly for the production of knowledge. The increased 
availability of venture capital and other financing, particularly 
the use of licensing and markets for technology, may have re-
duced the need for government support, as other solutions to 
potential market failures have appeared.
In addition, rather than focusing on overall R&D spending, 
we require a more nuanced understanding of policy details and 
implementation. How are grants allocated, for example, and 
can this process be improved? What is the appropriate balance 
of early-stage research and clinical development? Are pub-
lic-private partnerships an efficient use of resources? Studies 
using data and policy efforts from outside the US would be es-
pecially valuable, as the optimal policy is different for smaller 
countries, those with different scientific resources on which to 
draw, and those with different systems of government.
Once again, however, it is worth considering how models or 
empirical results from eras in which national economies were 
far less globally integrated may apply going forward. Links be-
tween countries can result in policy spillovers (in which domes-
tic policy choices have global consequences) as well as limit the 
impact of local policy (because most countries are only a small 
part of the global market). In the last several decades, interna-
tional cooperation has led to a harmonization of patent rights. 
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While this remains controversial, particularly in light of the in-
efficiencies associated with patents as policy instruments, this 
is evidence that countries can agree to address problems of 
free-riding in the presence of externalities. Similar efforts 
should be considered for R&D funding.
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Session 1  Background
The Korean health care system has witnessed a remarkable 
expansion in health coverage over the past 30 years. Today 
Korea combines one of the highest life expectancies in the 
world with one of the lowest levels of health care expenditure 
amongst middle and high-income countries. Partly this has 
been achieved through a consolidation of a historically frag-
mented health insurance sector into an efficient social in-
surance funder of health care. This has allowed the prices of 
health care to be contained, helping to maintain overall 
expenditure.
However with increasing life expectancy comes an aging 
population and growing pressure on health care expenditure. 
As can be seen from 〔Figures 3-1〕 and 〔Figures 3-2〕 Korea has 
experienced high rates of growth in health care expenditure. 
Currently health expenditure is just under 7% of GDP, which is 
below the OECD average. Yet compared to other OECD coun-
tries, Korean health care spending per capita has grown twice 
as fast as the OECD average growth rate, almost trebling since 
2000. This is clearly unsustainable.
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〔Figure 3-1〕 Health Care Expenditure as % of GDP 2000-2012
〔Figure 3-2〕 Health Care Expenditure per Capita($) 2000-2013
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This rate of health expenditure growth has been a con-
sequence of the expansion in insurance coverage and the sub-
sequent increase in the access to health care and the resultant 
utilisation growth. Expenditure pressures have largely been as-
sociated with increasing volume of health care use and increas-
ing preferences for high-quality medicine delivered largely 
through the acute hospital sector.
〈Table 3-1〉 Health expenditure growth versus GDP Growth
The aim of this paper is to put Korean health care ex-
penditure growth into some perspective. As <Table 3-1> illus-
trates many middle- and high-income countries have seen 
health care expenditure, with some recent exceptions, out-
pacing the growth of national income per head in these coun-
tries for the past 40 years. In reaction there has been greater 
understanding of the mechanisms of the growth in health care 
68 Korean pharmaceutical industry policy: Lessons for Korea
expenditure, as well as increasingly efficient regulation of the 
sector itself.
Worldwide, health sector regulation has extended beyond 
traditional concerns with safety and efficacy, to evidence of 
performance and value. This is not surprising given that all 
OECD countries have seen their health care sectors grow faster 
than the general rate of growth in their economies. Put simply 
the health care sector, in all middle- and high-income coun-
tries throughout the world has expanded fasted (or declined 
less) than the competing sectors of each these economies. 
These widely prevalent regulatory reforms aimed at 
bench-marking performance and establishing value for money 
have targeting the curbing of such growth, and while not com-
pletely successful they have moved the balance of power back 
to the funders of health care and away from health care 
providers. The reforms are centred on three pillars.
First, prospective payment associated with pre-determined 
budgets and fixed prices,(Diagnostic Related Group pricing or 
DRG pricing), for services have commonly been introduced into 
the hospital sector. This helps to keep expenditure pressures 
down in what remains the largest component of any health care 
sector. As well as routinely accounting for 60% of the total 
health care budget, the hospital sector acts as the main conduit 
for new technology up-take and diffusion. 
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Second, as DRGs have been introduced they have been ac-
companied by the increasing use of Health Technology 
Agencies, (HTAs), to introduce, regulate and monitor quality 
standards within the health care sector. Importantly HTAs have 
increasingly used the establishment of clinical guidelines, sup-
ported by the growth of evidence-based medicine, to comple-
ment (or even undermine) the self-regulating powers of the 
medical profession. This has allowed managed care to evolve as 
an international movement with clinical guidelines providing 
explicit contracts as a complementary basis upon which DRG 
pricing can be expanded.
Third, the establishment of HTAs have also increasingly been 
used to establish value for money criteria against which to 
judge whether new health care technologies, and in particular 
pharmaceuticals, should be introduced into the health care 
sector. This also complements the use of DRG pricing, as DRG 
prices tend to based on historical treatment costs, introducing 
a bias against the up-take of new technologies. HTA val-
ue-based pricing (VBP) approaches allow cost-effective new 
treatments to be amalgamated into DRG fees and therefore in-
troduced in a more timely fashion. 
Such changes directly impact on the ability of a health sector 
to innovate, as DRGs tend to benchmark the average practice 
and value based pricing attempts to restrict new technology 
diffusion. Possibly, given the Weisbrod conundrum, where ex-
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tending insurance coverage leads to more health care technol-
ogy that in turn creates a demand for more insurance, this is 
warranted. It is also true that new health care technology ap-
pears to account for somewhere between 10 and 55% of the in-
crease in health care expenditure growth (Smith et al, 2009). 
Although as such estimates are based on controlling for con-
founding factors and attributing the residual to the growth 
component of technology, little can be said of the mechanism 
through which this operates.
In line with this global revolution in health care regulation it 
is likely that the Korean health care system will also be sub-
jected to higher levels of regulation as a response to Korean’s 
fast growing expenditure levels. I consequently discuss these 
regulatory aspects in some detail below, beginning with a dis-
cussion of the general form of regulation that has captured the 
health care sector as based on Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) 
pricing in the hospital sector complemented by HTA evaluation 
of value based pricing, particularly as applied to the pharma-
ceutical sector. I then turn to consider how this has impacted 
on the timing of new drugs to market, before presenting some 
conclusions relating to the impact of such regulation on health 
care innovation generally. I then end with some general con-
clusions on regulation and innovation within the health care 
sector.  
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Session 2  DRG pricing
The hospital sector remains in a dominant position in most 
health care sectors, accounting for upwards of 60% of health 
care expenditure. Moreover the hospital plays a pivotal role in 
the up-take and diffusion of new health sector technology. It is 
little surprise that there has been increasing attention in seek-
ing to control expenditure in this sector. The general trend in 
controlling hospital sector costs has focussed on the concept of 
yardstick competition as associated with Shliefer (1985) and 
builds on the introduction of Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) 
pricing introduced by Medicare in the late 1980s.
Medicare is the major insurer of the elderly in the USA, and 
provides coverage of hospital care for those over the age of 65. 
In the late 1980s, following a number of years of deficit fund-
ing, Medicare federal administrators moved from a low-pow-
ered incentive structure, based on retrospective payment and 
an implicit fee-for-service payment system to a prospective 
payment system where the volume of hospital patients would 
be reimbursed through a fixed fee for treating all patients with-
in the same DRG. The fee itself is estimated through calculation 
of an average cost of treating patients within any given DRG at 
comparable hospitals.
The basic idea works as follows. If the total revenue is esti-
72 Korean pharmaceutical industry policy: Lessons for Korea
mated for each hospital based on the average cost for a set of 
comparable hospitals that are also producing the same DRG, 
this gives an incentive to each hospital to cut costs below the 
average, through inducing investment in cost-reducing tech-
nology to generate a surplus. When all hospitals do this the 
average cost falls and this incentive continues until price is set 
equal to the true average cost of treatment within each DRG.
Note two aspects of this equilibrium. First, the funder need 
not know the average cost of treatment within each hospital or 
each DRG. It is enough for the funder to collate information 
form each provider and then announce that the reimbursement 
level for each DRG is going to be set at the average level of the 
sample of average costs collected. This then provides hospitals 
that are above the sample average to reduce their treatment 
costs over time. Indeed the variation in treatment costs will also 
narrow over time, as the funder declares a reimbursement level 
that is nearer and nearer the true average cost of treatment. In 
other words, even with asymmetry of information the funder 
can establish incentives for all hospitals to move towards treat-
ment at the true average cost of provision. Second, this pricing 
game establishes a regulated price that is compatible with the 
price that would be established if perfect market competition 
were in place and providers were just covering their costs of 
production; namely price set at average cost.
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Shliefer (1985) shows the ideal conditions under which this 
efficient outcome will evolve, but also shows that under a fixed 
pricing rule based on yardstick competition and observable da-
ta can lead to efficient hospital production. As long as there is 
no collusion and the sample of hospitals providing each DRG is 
large enough there is little loss from simply setting price equal 
to average cost across all hospitals. Of course there must be no 
gaming of the system either. Hospitals should not attempt to 
re-classify low cost DRG treatments into high cost treatments 
to earn more revenue. They should also react rationally to the 
incentive mechanism, closing wards where the fail to compete 
with their yardstick providers.
While DRG pricing has been rolled out globally, it should be 
noted that not all countries have introduced DRGs for re-
imbursement purposes. A number of countries have introduced 
them merely to improve the information flow on hospital costs. 
Where they have been introduced for reimbursement purposes 
- and their introduction is truly global having extended from the 
USA through Europe to parts of Asia and South America – the 
effects have been predictable. In the USA, where the hospital 
sector has been characterised as one of excess supply and the 
DRG reimbursement of Medicare cases forms only part of the 
hospital sector reimbursement mechanism as large elements of 
hospital care remain in the privately insured sector, their in-
troduction has led to a decrease in the typical length of stay for 
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any DRG, while activity has generally fallen. Across Europe, 
where the public funding of hospital care predominates, the in-
troduction of DRG pricing has generally led to decreased length 
of stay and increased activity as hospitals compete for patients 
under budget constrained systems. (See Busse et al, 2011)
In the real world there are regulatory costs to ensure through 
monitoring that hospital providers are not gaming, operating 
cartels and are providing sufficient information for the system 
to operate effectively. Not surprisingly then the introduction of 
DRG, fixed fee pricing has lead to an increase in case-review 
and the establishment of guidelines on case management. This 
role is undertaken by the health care regulators, typically em-
bedded within a Health Technology Assessment agency (HTA). 
It is this increasing use of standardised treatment protocols, to 
define the appropriate treatment for each DRG that has been 
termed “managed care”.
This standardisation of the treatment protocols has two 
functions. It first introduces explicit specification of the 
(implicit) contract struck between the funders and providers of 
health care. This allows specification of the allowable treat-
ment levels that are to be reimbursed. Second, it sets an aver-
age fixed reimbursement fee for each of these standardised, 
deliverable treatments. The average fee, the DRG price, estab-
lished at the established true average treatment cost. Both 
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functions increase the degree of risk share by the hospital 
compared to the funder. The standardisation and fixing of the 
DRG reimbursement both promote the use of “average” care.
If the hospital product is truly a differential one, differ-
entiated through quality and resulting in a monopolistic mar-
ket, the crude imposition of yardstick-based competition may 
lead to a general underproduction of quality, especially if qual-
ity signals are difficult to observe and purchasers are 
cost-conscientious. If hospitals are grouped inappropriately, 
squeezing hospitals price-cost mark-ups may do nothing more 
than reduce the quality of care. Moreover, as the reimbursed 
price is based on historically observed cost-outputrelation-
ships, and if the hospital does act as an important conduit for 
new, innovative medicine, then treatment quality may be fur-
ther compromised.
For both of these reasons the health care regulatory system, 
worldwide, has tended to complement the introduction of DRG 
hospital payments with the assessment of new, innovative 
health care technologies, again through HTA regulation. 
Increasingly these HTA assessments rely on some form of value 
for money assessment, increasingly referred to as value based 
pricing for new technologies, in particular pharmaceuticals. I 
now turn to consider this aspect of the global revolution in 
health care regulation.
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Session 3  Value based pricing
Value-based pricing, which increasingly underpins drug re-
imbursement within public-sector financed, budget de-limited 
health sectors, looks to estimate the value of a drug based on 
available evidence of performance. In this way drug payment is 
meant to vary in accordance with the clinical impact of the 
specific treatment in a particular patient population. The val-
ue-based pricing (VBP) approach can be widened to in-
corporate factors such as the burden of illness in society, the 
unmet need addressed, the budget impact of up-take, the de-
gree of innovation judged to be associated with the drug and 
the wider social benefits derived from the drug.
The extension of regulation associated with VBP has in-
creased the demand for evidence. Not only are head-to-head 
comparisons increasingly demanded, but evidence on the im-
pact on existing treatment-pathways is also necessitated. 
However, evidence is not always complete at time of approval. 
Uncertainty may remain over long-term outcomes, treatment 
heterogeneity and the comparative value of interventions in 
clinical practice. This has lengthened the regulatory process, 
with a consequent impact on market access time, which sub-
sequently affects the accrual of patient benefits and tends to 
erode the patent-protected market status that accompanies 
new innovation.
Chapter 3. The Lessons for Korea Arising from the General Regulation of 
Innovative health products 77
It has also led to increased opportunities to improve knowl-
edge on safety, effectiveness and value for actual practice. 
Increasing data demands have led to improvements in data 
sources, databases and analysis. There is increasing apprecia-
tion of clinical registries and research networks for example. 
While simultaneously there has been increasing attention 
drawn to population risk adjustment, the relationship between 
short-term, surrogate markers and long-term outcomes and 
improvements in methods generally.
As a result of these regulatory factors and the general in-
crease in the complexity and uncertainty associated with R&D 
in the pharmaceutical sector, the cost of bringing new products 
to market has increased rapidly, with some estimates being as 
high as €2,600 million to bring a drug to market as only 1 in 
10,000 compounds are successfully marketed. While debates 
continue surrounding the degree of marketing versus develop-
ment expenditure across the pharmaceutical industry, drug de-
velopment costs have risen nearly 600% over the past 30 years, 
as R&D addresses more intractable diseases such as cancer and 
neurological disease. While there is some optimism to be 
gained from the increase in New Molecular Entities (NMEs) be-
fore the FDA and EMA over the past year, success rates asso-
ciated with NMEs have fallen from 1 in 5 in the 1980s to 1 in 10 
in the 2000s.
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Others have recently documented falling pharmaceutical 
R&D productivity measured by expenditure to NMEs. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that increasing attention is being 
focused on the returns from such funding. In the area of health 
care the social benefit gained is difficult to quantify generally, 
and this also applies to the benefits derived from the R&D in-
vestments made by the pharmaceutical sector. While R&D pro-
ductivity can be captured to an extent by the expenditure per 
new drug approved, although this undoubtedly under-estimates 
net worth. Drug approvals capture a heterogeneous mix of 
effect. Even focusing on the health return alone, they may alle-
viate symptoms or be life-saving; prevent disease or offer par-
tial or complete cure.
At a wider level, at least three levels of returns to medical 
R&D can be distinguished: returns specified in terms of scien-
tific knowledge; returns specified in terms of health benefits; 
and returns specified in terms of wider economic returns. All 
three levels have associated problems of measurement and 
evaluation. Although possibly the most inherently innovative 
part of medical R&D, returns to scientific knowledge are espe-
cially difficult to quantify. Spillover effects from knowledge 
gained in a specific area but used to generate innovations in 
other areas are difficult to trace, let alone quantify. The time 
span over which to measure R&D returns is hard to define. For 
these, and other reasons regulators have focused on the health 
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gain derived from pharmaceuticals as the primary measure of 
value. As discussed below even this is not without controversy. 
Even if the measurement of health is agreed upon there is a 
tendency to apply inconsistent health gain levels in the assess-
ment of individual pharmaceuticals targeting different disease 
categories, even though there is a want of empirical support 
for doing so.
As reimbursement is increasingly tied to product value, some 
have argued that all dimensions of value must be taken account 
off, and that the highest levels of reimbursement should be giv-
en to the most innovative products. This calls for a definition of 
innovation. General agreement can be given to Aronson et al’s 
(2012) definition of “rewardable innovation” as a product that 
provides “through a step change, something novel with the po-
tential or proven ability to yield, for individuals and/or society 
a treatment not previously available or a clinically significant 
improvement, with large health gains and a favourable benefit 
to harm balance, at an acceptable cost”. Such a statement re-
quires further clarity of course, but as the authors state is not 
meant to rule out “evolutionary” or incremental change.
Some go further and argue that social benefit be defined and 
subsequently argue that attaching some form of societal will-
ingness to pay thresholds to a treatment is required as a means 
of attaching further clarity to value. While there are difficulties 
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still to be resolved in attaching monetary thresholds to health 
gains, a number of public bodies in Europe support the im-
plementation of such thresholds to help establish the re-
imbursement price of pharmaceutical products. The use of 
such valuations to help determine reimbursement levels has led 
to the value of the product being established in terms of health 
gain and society’s willingness to pay for this gain is likewise es-
tablished, the appropriate reimbursement price for each prod-
uct can be established. 
Moreover if proven, should high value products command 
high levels of reimbursement under a VBP system? Budget im-
pact, as measured not only directly through value but also by 
volume of use, is sometimes also taken into account. Under 
budget constrained funding systems, the opportunity cost of 
high value products on de-limited drug budgets, given that it 
may be politically difficult to withdraw treatments, tends to re-
sult in a focus on the appropriate patient population in an at-
tempt to limit budget impact by restricting use tohigh risk 
populations. 
This of course moves pricing away from any direct pro-
duction cost-based notion of reimbursement. Given the high 
R&D costs associated with establishing products in this sector 
this has been argued to lead to the creation of disincentives for 
investment in long-term R&D, especially as the costs of R&D 
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appear to be rising considerably. The use of patent protection 
and the rights established to market exclusivity help to amelio-
rate these disincentives somewhat.
However as patents are associated with NMEs and not phar-
maceutical products, market exclusivity is undermined through 
product competition. Moreover, to the extent that product 
price is increasingly regulated through recourse to establishing 
incremental (health-) value-added patent protection is weak-
ened and R&D incentives are distorted towards a focus on large 
therapeutic markets. This has led to arguments that there 
should be a de-coupling of product price from the mechanisms 
used to incentivize R&D behaviour.
There is also increasing concern that as the length of devel-
opment time increases, at least partly because of greater regu-
lation, as associated with establishing incremental value and 
then reimbursement, there is a further distortion in the phar-
maceutical market. Market access time is lengthened and 
therefore patient benefit reduced. In an attempt to move prod-
ucts on to the market more swiftly interest has been growing in 
a number of countries of quickening the regulatory review of 
products. A number of suggestions have been implemented 
based on different definitions of innovation, and leading to fur-
ther inconsistencies in the regulatory review process facing 
pharmaceutical products.
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The most direct returns relate to improvements in health 
care technology, which result in higher productivity within the 
health care sector and in improved population health. The re-
turn to R&D then becomes an issue of valuing health. Most 
European markets now appear to support some form of 
so-called value-based pricing VBP regulation. 
In France and Germany many product reimbursements re-
flect innovative value, where innovative value is aligned with 
health benefit within a given therapeutic area (Bridges et al, 
2009; Mossialos and Oliver, 2005). While England appears to be 
implementing a reimbursement system, like Canada and 
Sweden, based on health benefit as determined largely through 
implementation of cost-effectiveness thresholds. Here value, 
and the subsequent reimbursed price of the product is ex-
plicitly linked to the incremental health benefit produced, as 
specified by Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) gained. The def-
inition of value is slightly different across jurisdictions, but al-
ways related to the health benefit attained. 
From an economics perspective value is a measure of 
welfare. The objective is to maximize welfare. A return to R&D 
would then measure the improvement in the welfare gained by 
society from, for example new product development, assessed 
in terms of the value gained. Value gained may relate to im-
proved welfare resulting from increased benefit or decreased 
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cost. An obvious characteristic of value gained specified in 
terms of increased benefit relates to health gain. Crucially a 
valuation has to be attached to the measured health gain for 
any return to measure improved benefit. Health gains may be 
the same for different treatments applied to different parts of 
society; but society may value these health gains differently as 
they apply to different members of society. The health gains 
received by children may have higher value than the same level 
of health gain received by middle-aged women and these may 
be valued higher than the same level of health gain received by 
middle-aged men. This is not a philosophical point; it is merely 
noting that health gain is not the same as valuation. The role of 
the regulator is to assign value. This tends to be done in two 
main ways: through consideration of the therapeutic value 
added or through some form of cost-effectiveness analysis 
based around an measure of health benefit, such as Quality 
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) gained. I consider both in turn:
  3.1 Health valued as Therapeutic Value Added
For a number of European Health Technology Agencies 
(HTAs) the standard assessment of value is defined through es-
timation of the therapeutic value added (TVA) derived from a 
product. Germany’s IQWiG Methods Guidelines (2015), for ex-
ample, assesses patient relevant outcomes such as improved 
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mortality, improved symptom, complication and side-effect 
profiles and improved quality of life. New health care tech-
nologies are assessed in terms of these outcomes against the 
existing standard therapy. Clinical trial evidence on TVA is 
considered to be the gold-standard. As such, from an economic 
perspective TVA is not concerned with value per se, but rather 
estimates of the differences in efficacy or effectiveness. The 
exception to this may be the definition of TVA assessed 
through changes in Quality of Life (QoL) measures, but such 
measures would have to relate to patient preferences in a logi-
cal manner to map these preferences against true value. It is 
most unlikely that such a mapping is straightforward or under-
pins these measures and QoL measures are most likely to be no 
more than an aggregation of symptom, complication and 
side-effect profiles.
TVA, if confined to health measurement is then most prob-
ably a measure of health benefit rather than be a valuation of 
that health benefit. This appears to be how it is used in a num-
ber of countries. France uses TVA within it’s HAS technology 
assessment agency ASMR scaling. This six point definitional 
scale is an ordering, with innovative medicine awarded the 
highest reimbursement if innovative therapeutic benefit can be 
determined. Innovative drugs are then eligible for fast track 
pricing. Similarly, Italy rewards innovative products provisions 
for products through the Italian Medicines Agency 
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(AgenziaItaliana del Farmaco – AIFA) by considering the avail-
ability of treatments and the extent of the therapeutic effect 
these provide compared to existing treatments. Belgium’s CRM 
agency also grants premium pricing to innovative products that 
demonstrate added therapeutic value. Austria operates perhaps 
the widest definition of innovation as based on a novel mecha-
nism of action, a new formulation within a class or the ability 
to meet an unmet need, with innovative products commanding 
a premium price as based on cost-effectiveness calculations.
If TVA is used (directly or indirectly) as a basis for reimburse-
ment, then under a fixed budget system, the price establishes 
the opportunity cost of the health benefit foregone in using 
each new technology within a therapeutic area. To the extent 
that the health gain is calibrated against standard therapy in 
any given therapeutic area TVA may differ in a relative sense; 
the value added may be different for any given treatment area, 
even though the absolute health gain is the same as produced 
by another intervention in another therapeutic area. Absolute 
effect may be of similar magnitude for different interventions 
in different therapeutic areas, but the comparative or relative 
effectiveness may differ across therapeutic area. If reimburse-
ment is attached to relative effectiveness, under a fixed budget 
system, the opportunity cost of resource use will differ across 
different therapeutic areas, implying that some treatments are 
“valued” higher than others. Unless there is firm empirical evi-
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dence to support this differential valuation of different ther-
apeutic areas, such an approach will lead to inconsistency.
  3.2 Health benefits as QALYs
The QALY is a widely recognized valuation instrument that 
attempts to combine dimensions of morbidity and mortality in-
to a single commensurate measure of health state. The QALY 
has been used extensively for two main reasons: it arguably 
values health outcomes in a more acceptable metric than mon-
ey does; and it feeds more easily into the wider medical deci-
sion-making process. Whether the QALY is reflective of health 
state preferences or health states per se, has given rise to a 
long rather fruitless literature (see Broome(1993) for a dis-
cussion of definition).
In most health care systems QALYs appear to be taken as 
measures of health states per se with an additional valuation on 
society’s WTP for a given additional QALY taken as represent-
ing the societal value of a QALY.Even if agreement is reached 
over this normative approach, the actual calculation of a QALY 
relies on the measurement of preferences for different health 
states. In other words, the use of QALYs in health resource al-
locations moves us from the normative to the positive, where 
the decision rule based on QALY maximization under resource 
constraint necessitates some measure of the societal WTP for 
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additional QALY gains.
Some have argued that individuals may make systematic 
biases in attempting to measure preferences associated with 
their quality and length of life. Dolan and Khaneman (2008) ar-
gue that such preferences are liable to be distorted by an in-
dividual’s own experiences and that, in any case, as health 
states change individuals will adapt, so who to ask also be-
comes important. Others argue that the instruments used to 
measure such preferences are not well understood and may 
likewise impart biases. Broome (1993) has eloquently argued 
that notwithstanding these problems, and that although addi-
tionally the QALY may not be conceptually clear and that the 
QALY may reflect the ‘goodness’ of or benefit from a state of 
health rather than a preference, it still represents the best ap-
proach to have been developed to date.7)
7) There are other contenders in terms of health state valuation. Other 
instruments such as Years of Healthy Life (HYL) and health-adjusted healthy 
life are QALYs in all but acronym (Berthelot et al., 1993; Erickson et al., 
1995). Mehrez and Gafni (1981) proposed values based on health profiles, 
where various health states are considered in different sequences of event 
(profiles), and individuals trade off the number of years in perfect health 
against the years in profile that they deem equivalent; this seems an 
extension of the QALY concept to incorporate time in a health state into 
the value. Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), which estimate life 
expectancy lost and weight this by the number of years lived in disability, 
are possibly the most commonly proposed alternative. Airoldi and Morton 
(2007) argue that once age weighting and differences in discounting into the 
DALY calculation have been made and adjustments made to allow a 
comparison between loss in quality of life and the disability weighting in 
the DALY, the two valuation concepts do not differ much. Both Airoldi 
(2007) and Sassi (2006) found, however, that the actual estimates of health 
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In a number of cases the WTP for a QALY, the so-called 
threshold value, appears to be similar. In England the threshold 
value is taken to be £20,000 - £30,000 per QALY, which is sim-
ilar to the value of $50,000 per QALY given by the US cost-ef-
fectiveness panel (Gold et al, 1996), and the English value is 
used as an international benchmark by the Swedish HTA body. 
Devlin, Parkin and Appleby (Written Evidence for the House of 
Commons Select Committee Inquiry on NICE) provide evidence 
that NICE effectively operates a threshold somewhat above 
£30,000 per QALY, and that these were justified as based on a 
“special considerations” argument. Special considerations pre-
sumably relate to the mandate given to NICE to consider issues 
of innovation, patient preferences and political considerations 
as well as cost-effectiveness and therapeutic benefit when as-
sessing health care technologies. Claxton et al (2015) have re-
cently used NHS opportunity (treatment) cost calculations to esti-
mate that the QALY value implicitly used in the NHS (in 2008/09) 
was £13,000 per QALY (estimated as £12,936 per QALY).
While the methodological debate over the estimation is 
on-going, the opportunity cost approach, unlike the WTP ap-
proach, does attempt to explicitly recognize the budget 
constraints. The argument is that the NHS budget is pre-de-
termined by central government expenditure rounds, and once 
change based on the two approaches do differ systematically.
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fixed the up-take of new treatments within this budget dis-
places other existing treatments. This displacement must take 
account of the opportunity cost, defined by the cost-effective-
ness levels of these existing treatments.
That said, the current NICE cost per QALY estimates appear 
to rest upon WTP calculations. Although end-of-life premiums, 
and specifically cancer premiums have also been implemented 
by health technology assessment agencies in a number of juris-
dictions, including NICE in England. In the UK, NICE appears 
to accept an extra weight of approximately 2.5 applied to 
end-of-life therapies giving a cost-per-QALY threshold for 
these therapies of £50,000 per QALY.
The justification for these differential values presumably be-
ing that society attaches a different value to life at end of life. 
This is the argument used in other UK government depart-
ments; for example the Health and Safety Executive apply a 
value of twice the standard Value of Prevented Fatality (VPF) for 
cancer when assessing their cost-benefit decisions. Dixon et al 
(2009),however, in a review of the empirical evidence on social 
valuations in health found little support for different valuation 
of end of life treatments, although they suggest that severity of 
illness rather than shortness of life expectancy may warrant a 
premium given the empirical evidence.
Others, including Coast and Lavander (2009), have suggested 
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that the QALY is not useful in valuing end-of-life care as when 
there is little or no life expectancy gain as the QALY collapses 
in one dimension (the Life Year becomes redundant); that qual-
ity of life is much more important and the QALY is not sensitive 
enough to capture all quality of life dimensions at end of life; 
that patient preferences are unstable at end of life; that QALYs 
use a scale which anchors on a value of death (normally as = 0) 
and this is invalid if death is imminent; that time is valued dif-
ferently at end of life compared to other stages of life. All such 
problems amalgamate to make the QALY a redundant measure 
for end of life care.
Round (2012) disputes these claims, arguing that most are 
empirical there is currently no empirical evidence to support 
them. Of the evidence that does exist Pinto-Prades et al (2014) 
finds some support for higher weighting at the end of life, al-
though interestingly this does not appear to reflect higher valu-
ation to reflect proximity to death per se, rather that quality of 
life improvement at end-of-life may be valued greater than 
small additions to life extension. It is not established how these 
premia are weighed, for example, with curative treatments.
If health sector R&D is supported primarily for product de-
velopment that improves welfare, appropriate valuation of any 
associated health gain has to be made. This is particularly true 
in publicly funded health systems where, assuming the general 
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principle is that public sector expenditure be allocated con-
sistently across different sectors and within the health care sec-
tor different treatment areas, the valuation should rest on 
sound, consistent empirical findings.
The threshold value of £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY is not 
however strictly enforced within the UK, with some empirical 
evidence suggesting that the applied threshold is over £30,000 
per QALY. Others have argued for a more explicit opportunity 
cost of NHS resource use, estimating this threshold to be 
around £13,000 per QALY. There is also an implied threshold of 
approximately £50,000 per QALY in place for end-of-life care, 
but no empirical support relating to social valuations to sup-
port this end-of-life threshold.
There also seems to be some inconsistency associated with 
the use of TVA relative effectiveness measures as used for ex-
ample by IQWiG in Germany, across therapeutic areas. To the 
extent that both TVA and cost-per-QALY valuations inform 
product reimbursement within the health care sector such in-
consistencies serve to distort the regulatory process.
There is some recognition that other characteristics of value 
may be important. Value attached to increasing knowledge per 
se is recognised, but in a policy context is not separable from 
value defined in terms of health. The French ASMR system, The 
German GMB and the Italian reimbursement authority all try to 
92 Korean pharmaceutical industry policy: Lessons for Korea
give the highest reimbursement award to innovative medicine, 
for example, while measuring the return to innovation largely 
through TVA as defined above. Certainly across these author-
ities innovation definitions are applied differently. For exam-
ple, within the therapeutic area of oncology the French system 
appears to be slightly more lenient than the German system, 
possibly reflecting the French acceptance of Progression Free 
Survival as a surrogate endpoint, while the German authorities 
place greater weight on Overall Survival.
Other commonly discussed aspects of value relate to the wid-
er productivity returns associated with a healthier population 
or to savings in other public areas, for example social care, yet 
regulators may not explicitly incorporate such returns formally 
into their assessment of value arising from health care 
interventions. This may reflect the difficulties in overcoming 
governmental budget silos where, once public funds have been 
allocated to various government departments it becomes diffi-
cult to re-allocate or cross-subsidise funds that reflect the wid-
er societal benefits arising from health improvements. While 
such wider benefits are real and in theory should be acknowl-
edged the specific perspective adopted by any single depart-
ment may rule out their consideration.  Certainly this is the 
case for most European health departments, which tend to lim-
it value to a pre-defined valuation of health and focus on their 
health budget alone.
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Moreover, if the health benefit is judged to be high (close to 
curative, for example) then the cost-effectiveness ratio may be 
judged acceptable, within predetermined thresholds, but the 
budgetary impact may be exceptional. If the effectiveness is 
high, this might be associated with a “high value” and therefore 
high price, consistent with a cost-effectiveness ratio that is 
deemed “acceptable” within societal norms. At the same time, 
given treatment prevalence and the high price, budgetary im-
pact may be extremely high, posing a major concern to pub-
licly funded reimbursement bodies that may judge the budget 
impact excessive. Some have argued that this budget impact 
should be taken account off and the price/reimbursement de-
cision adjusted to take account of this. This is clearly a further 
value impact that is directly associated with a definition of val-
ue based on health gain. The proponents of the opportunity 
cost valuation of health benefit, defined as a cost per QALY 
and based on displaced treatments, would argue that this, not 
the WTP approach, is the consistent method to be applied to 
budget constrained systems.
Session 4  Regulatory Impacts on R&D
Regulation is primarily applied within the health care sector 
to ensure product quality but also enforces product price and 
volume of care delivered. If regulation successfully contains 
94 Korean pharmaceutical industry policy: Lessons for Korea
price and volume the return to innovation in the health care 
sector is reduced. As noted above DRG pricing in the hospital 
sector can be used to reduce hospital reimbursement prices to 
average costs which, if coupled with centralised control of 
health care budgets can have a subsequent dampening effect 
on innovation. This is in line with the findings by Beck et al 
(2009) that centralised budgetary health care systems appear to 
have lower levels of take-up and diffusion of new technology 
than decentralised, fee-for-service systems.
If this regulation of the hospital sector is accompanied by the 
use of HTA evaluations of new technologies, particularly drugs, 
and a single payment is used to cover both the production cost 
of new therapies and the cost of the R&D carried out by manu-
facturers to discover it, then innovation is further dampened. 
The regulation of product price may be justified in the phar-
maceutical sectoras market access is accompanied by patent 
protection, which through protecting market entry creates mo-
nopoly rights to producers, and provides an incentive to invest 
in R&D given the problems of appropriating research returns.
If the regulated price is pushed down to manufacturing cost 
levels, regulation reduces the producers’ ability to re-capture 
their substantial R&D investments. Patent protection will still 
ensure capture of some of the return to R&D, but does not 
guarantee a positive net return on R&D investment.  Little is 
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known about the interaction between patent protection and 
price regulation. The importance of this is that patent pro-
tection is coupled directly to price setting; the more protected 
a market the higher the price can be. This coupling con-
sequently provides R&D incentives and reward. Patent pro-
tected price, one instrument, is attempting therefore to regu-
late two targets; static and dynamic efficiency; product mo-
nopoly power and R&D investments. Determination of optimal 
patent coverage and optimal regulated product price is re-
quired to capture both static and dynamic efficiency.
The importance of patent protection is obvious for a system 
of internal financing of R&D. Numerous studies identify a pos-
itive relationship between R&D investment and drug prices 
(e.g. Grabowski and Vernon (1981);Vernon, 2005). While others 
emphasize the related relationship between market size and 
pharmaceutical innovation Dubois et al (2011).As price affects 
cash flow and expected revenue, and these latter variables de-
termine future R&D levels, along with the intensity of R&D in-
vestment function, there is therefore a direct link between 
price regulation and R&D. If price regulation distorts expected 
revenues, then there will be an adverse influence on R&D 
investments. If there is strong patent protection this may offset 
these distortionary effects, but if patent protection is too strong 
this provides incentives for over-investment in R&D. One form 
of regulation thus influences the other. 
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Pharmaceutical products typically face a number of regu-
latory hurdles. Evidence on the quality, safety and efficacy of 
new molecules is estimated to take around ten years of 
pre-clinical and clinical research time. Following review of the 
new product dossier by a regulatory authority such as the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA or the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) in Europe, marketing authorization is 
established, defining the relevant patient population and ther-
apeutic use. In Europe this is followed by regulation of pricing 
and reimbursement. Such regulation is lengthy, delays market 
access and erodes patent protection.  Of the literature ex-
plicitly addressing price and patent protection specifically a 
small number of articles empirically substantiate the claim that 
pharmaceutical pricing regulation lengthens the time to mar-
ket, erodes patent protection and thus damages access to 
medicines.
The outcome of research, new knowledge is acknowledged to 
be a public good, with the accompanying difficulties of its re-
turn being fully appropriated by the owner. Once produced 
new knowledge, if not protected, is easily acquired by rivals. 
This, plus the fact that new (fundamental) knowledge is lumpy 
in production (tends to occur in jumps rather than smooth in-
crements), and is subject to high levels of uncertainty leads to a 
well-recognised problem of under-production if it is not 
protected. Who would produce new knowledge if the returns 
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from the substantial investments required to produce it 
(because it is a highly uncertain and lumpy process) are not ap-
propriable, in other words the knowledge can be freely ac-
quired and used once it is produced?(Arrow, 1963).
Several studies have addressed delays attributable to drug re-
view processes generally (Dranove and Meltzer 1994; Thomas et 
al. 1998; Carpenter et al. 2003; Carpenter and Turenne 2004; 
Bolten and Degregorio 2002), while more recent studies have 
emphasize price controls and variations in reimbursement 
schemes (see, for example, Danzon and Epstein 2008; Lanjouw 
2005; Costa-Font, McGuire and Varol 2015).8)
Increased regulation has a direct effect on access time and 
an indirect effect, mediated through price constraint, on time 
to market. This imposes welfare losses, particularly when the 
innovations that are delayed are cost-effective therapies from a 
societal perspective. These welfare losses may extend to other 
countries if the delays affect reference price setting in other 
countries. Delays in adoption also reduce the net present value 
of R&D investments by delaying cash flows and shortening the 
exclusivity period, which could reduce future R&D and in-
8) Several studies have addressed delays attributable to drug review processes 
generally (Dranove and Meltzer 1994; Thomas et al. 1998; Carpenter et al. 
2003; Carpenter and Turenne 2004; Bolten and Degregorio 2002), while 
more recent studies have emphasize price controls and variations in 
reimbursement schemes (see, for example, Danzon and Epstein 2008; 
Lanjouw 2005; Costa-Font, McGuire and Varol 2015).
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novation (Giaccotto et al. 2005). Patent protection is therefore 
operating under increasing constraint from price regulation. 
Partly as a result of the erosion of true patent life through reg-
ulation the USA and Europe have both enacted patent restora-
tion laws.
Without patent protection there will be under-investment in 
R&D, as appropriability is affected, and a subsequent loss of 
dynamic efficiency (Horowitz and Lai, 1996; Hugh, Moore and 
Snyder, 2002;Hughes et al, 2002).Optimal R&D is influenced by 
not only revenue appropriability as gained through patent pro-
tection however, but also expected product revenues, future 
cash flow, the level of uncertainty in the market, market size 
and structure, the degree of product competition, demographic 
factors, policies relating to governmental R&D subsidies and 
duration of R&D investment(Camejo, McGrath and Herings, 
2011; Bardey, Bommier and Jullien, 2010;Isaac and Reynolds, 
1988). There is simply no empirical evidence on the impact 
that price regulation has on any of these factors.
In the pursuit of static efficiency through price regulation all 
the major European markets now appear to support some form 
of value-based pricing (VBP) where value and subsequent prod-
uct reimbursement price is explicitly linked to the incremental 
health benefit produced (OFT, 2007; Moise and Docteur, 2007). 
VBP approaches tend to confine value to health outcomes 
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through TVA or cost-effectiveness ratios. VBP, to the degree 
that it helps identify unmeet health needs, may however in-
corporate a degree of dynamic incentive by directing research 
activities into areas with high potential health gains. An imme-
diate problem is that VBP may not, in reality, have this desired 
effect due to long lags between research and product launch.
Recognizing VBP requires larger data requirements and that 
price regulation can lead to the erosion of patent time and 
lengthening of time-to-market one response has been to en-
hance VBP, through enforcing risk-sharing agreements. Under 
risk-share agreements payers and producers link payment to 
observed health outcomes. The UK NHS has made use of such 
arrangements with a number of performance based risk-shar-
ing agreements in place, for example in treatment areas for 
multiple myeloma and multiple sclerosis. Such schemes may 
have been helpful in addressing data requirements, but they 
have been accompanied by a lack of transparency, high admin-
istrative cost and general difficulties in setting performance 
targets. A major difficulty surrounds the collection and colla-
tion of patient data in these schemes. Such difficulties, accom-
panied with the detailed specification of the expected level of 
performance over a given time period, has seen a loss in the 
popularity of such schemes. Given these implementation diffi-
culties there is a trend towards patient access schemes, which 
are essentially price discount and/or pay-back schemes, as ap-
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pliedby the French reimbursement regulation. 
It is clear that there is an on-going interaction between price 
and patent regulation in the pharmaceutical market. Internal 
financing of R&D emphasises revenue maximisation, which 
when coupled with VBP regulation this may distort the R&D 
process to address the greatest potential markets. Price regu-
lation directly erodes patent protection and therefore the in-
centive to innovate. Yet strengthening patent protection can 
lead to duplication and over-investment in R&D investments. 
Unfortunately there is little empirical analysis of this inter-
action and it remains unclear how to define optimal patent 
depth and breadth and optimal VBP levels to ensure that static 
and dynamic efficiency are maintained.
At the same time, as noted earlier, the DRG pricing system op-
erating through the hospital level shifts financial risk to the pro-
vider of care, as well as standardising care making it more diffi-
cult for the main player in the health care sector to innovate. 
Certainly if the new technology, and in particular pharmaceut-
icals, make it through the value for money criteria established by 
the regulator, there also has to be a means through which 
up-take can be eased within the hospital sector itself. This 
clearly entails integrating new innovative therapies into current 
pricing practices, but it also requires the ability of incentive 
structures to promote improved performance practices.
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Session 5  Potential Regulatory Solutions to
Lengthening Time to Market
Recognizing the cost of longer market access times arising 
from regulation required to ensure safety and efficacy and then 
to establish reimbursement, a number of countries have re-
cently attempted to counter this regulatory delay through the 
definition of a number of exceptions in establishing general 
efficacy. Largely this has been though designation of innovative 
capacity as based on innovative value as it relates to health 
benefit. For example, the FDA has considered:
1. Accelerated Approval where faster approval is based on 
surrogate or intermediate clinical endpoints and these are 
considered predictive of final clinical benefit. Such appro-
val is applicable for drugs treating a serious condition that 
provide a “meaningful advantage over available thera-
pies”. Drugs approved on this indication are mandated to 
continue collection of clinical data in order to eventually 
substantiate their claim with a suitable endpoint, such as 
overall survival, post-marketing. First introduced in 1992.
2. Priority Review seeks to reduce the decision time for a giv-
en application from 10 months under a standard review to 
6 months. This review is applied to drugs providing a 
“significant improvement in the safety or effectiveness of 
the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of serious con-
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ditions when compared to standard applications.”
3. Fast Track designation aims to provide increased collabo-
ration between the manufacturer and the FDA to expedite 
the development and review processes. It is applied to 
drugs addressing an unmet medical need for a serious 
condition. The designation can be awarded on the basis of 
nonclinical or clinical data.
4. Breakthrough Therapy designation is a new, expedited 
pathway for the development of promising drugs, which 
receive intensive guidance and regulatory commitment. 
To be eligible the treatment has to apply to a serious con-
dition and requires “preliminary clinical evidence…that 
the drug may demonstrate substantial improvement on a 
clinically significant endpoint(s) over available 
therapies.”Unlike Fast Track designation preliminary clin-
ical evidence should be submitted at the latest at the end 
of Phase II trials. In terms of defining the value of a sub-
stantial breakthrough, there is no single definition of 
“substantial improvement”. Introduced in 2013.
Since their introduction there has been increasing use of 
these quicker routes to market. For example, since the in-
troduction of Accelerated Approval approximately 10% of all 
drug approvals have taken this route. However, using cancer 
drugs as an example, only 33% have been successful. High fail-
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ure rates have also been witnessed in the other quicker market 
access routes. Using cancer drugs as examples Priority Review 
has seen a 50% failure to be approved rate; and Fast Track a 
54% failure rate .Indeed with all fast access policies there is a 
potential adverse selection issue: the attraction of quicker ac-
cess may draw lower quality products into this route. A general 
criticism is the lack of transparency in the matching of specific 
drugs to the definitions used in the various expedited routes. 
There has also been a lack of discussion of the implications 
with respect to actual treatment given the lack of data asso-
ciated with some of these expedited routes of approval.
On top of these established quicker access pathways, the US 
Congress is also considering 21st Century Cures legislation 
where the proposal is for improved support for clinical trial re-
cruitment, clinical trial targeting and adaptive trial design; 
greater data and methods sharing; and aid to identify sub-
populations through the development of biomarkers.
In Europe the EMA has proven effective in harmonising drug 
approval across individual European countries. Although it has 
not replaced individual countries’ national medicines agencies, 
drug approval sought through EMA can act as a substitute to 
national approval. This has reduced regulatory costs for in-
dividual companies as well as widening access. Note however 
that drug approval is based on safety and efficacy alone and 
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that individual EU countries still take responsibility for pricing 
and reimbursement.
The EMA initiated Conditional Marketing Authorisation with 
a goal to speed access to promising drug therapy, where lim-
ited information is available on efficacy. Limited 1-year market 
access will be provided if patient benefit, based on efficacy da-
ta, can be shown in populations who have early access, and 
where additional clinical data will be forthcoming. Additionally 
the EMA’s Adaptive Pathways Pilot Programme, introduced in 
late 2014, is intended to improve access for narrow indications 
or well-defined populations. Early approval may be given con-
tingent on follow-up real world data provision.
It is clear that both the FDA and the EMA are concerned with 
ensuring regulation does not inhibit market access. While both 
regulatory bodies are concern, rightly, with their own juris-
diction, note that there are important spillover effects at work 
here. The faster the market access gained by innovative drugs 
in one jurisdiction the greater the availability of data for other 
regulators. Furthermore, the faster is the up-take in the USA or 
Europe, the greater the potential for innovation to diffuse to 
other countries.
These various attempts to resolve lengthening market access 
times are a response to the erosion of patent protection, which 
itself affects R&D incentives. While these attempts are im-
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portant responses, they are providing a range of different sig-
nals to producers. Not surprisingly there are definitional con-
sistency issues across the different designation routes and then 
sorting problems in seeking the best route for a specific drug, 
and possible adverse selection issues leading to relatively high 
failure rates associated with any given route. The importance 
of transparency in the definition of which regulatory route is 
applicable under what circumstance cannot be un-
der-estimated.
Session 6  Conclusions
Economic regulation is a fact of life in the pharmaceutical 
market. Market failure is ubiquitous in establishing efficient 
levels of R&D, as the returns to R&D activity cannot be fully 
appropriated unless protected. R&D is also inherently un-
certainty and investments in R&D activity are lumpy, involving 
large up-front costs.9) All such characteristics ensure that R&D 
activity will be too low unless protection is offered. As a result 
patents are in widespread use, establishing monopoly power 
for producers, creating incentives to stimulate the R&D behav-
iour that is required to deliver pharmaceutical products of ben-
efit to society. Patent regulation is useful in determining R&D 
 9) Uncertainty is different from risk which can be insured against.
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appropriability and complementing pricing regulation through 
securing revenue returns, which provides a financial basis for 
further R&D.
Moreover, health is such a fundamental good that regulation 
is required to ensure that the delivered care is safe and 
efficacious.10) Legislation cannot guarantee this is the case as 
contract and tort law would only offer compensation after 
harm. Regulation is therefore required here to ensure products 
do no harm. While incurring the cost of lengthening time to 
market, such regulation protects against product quality.
Reimbursement regulation is used to reward value, while si-
multaneously offsetting the monopoly created through patent 
protection. Such regulation, particularly in the predominately 
public funded European health care systems characterised ei-
ther by tax-based or social insurance financing where the vast 
majority of health care expenditure is budget-delimited, has 
increasingly been applied to both the reimbursement of hospi-
tal treatments through the DRG fixed-fee process, and to the 
licensing and the pricing of drugs. Where there is an estab-
lished rationale for pricing regulation it tends to be based on 
some form of value based pricing with incremental health ben-
efit forming the main characterisation of value. Such price and 
reimbursement regulation does not efficiently incentivize R&D 
10) This argument applies to all health care.
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and may distort R&D activity towards large markets as firms at-
tempt to recover costs. 
Europe has led the way in results-based payment structures 
centred on VBP. Even the DRG system is now being used to en-
courage improved performance. For example, Medicare only 
guarantees DRG reimbursement if patients are not re-admitted 
within 30-days of initial discharge. This encourages hospitals 
to improve outcome performance. Increasingly VBP is also be-
ing applied in considering the introduction of new tech-
nologies, particularly pharmaceuticals, into the health care 
systems.
Regulation has associated costs arising from monitoring, data 
acquisition, delayed access time to new innovative medicine, 
creation of monopoly rent through patent protection and the 
offsetting concern of static price efficiency as it affects dynam-
ic R&D behaviour. Setting efficient levels of regulation in this 
sector is by no means straightforward. Static and dynamic effi-
ciency are intertwined. The growth in regulation within the 
sector, and in particular the recent growth in attempts to se-
cure quality as well as optimal quantity of care and the growth 
in explicit reimbursement regulation, is in part testimony to the 
high and possibly increasing degrees of complexity being ex-
perienced by the sector.
Efficient regulation should reward both innovative R&D and 
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products achieving high health benefits. This may encourage 
change in the current system. It is likely that this will include 
increasing use of priority channels for market access accom-
panied by increasing use of post-uptake evidence. Increasing 
use of individual risk data to identify high-risk populations to 
better target the use of innovative medicines with payment 
linked to quality and cost for a pre-specified population. Under 
a budget de-limited system greater use of standardised proto-
cols, performance based pricing and restriction on the volumes 
of use of new innovative health care seems inevitable. Such 
measures will affect the return on innovation within this sector. 
It remains to be seen how this will play out.
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연구 2015-07 호스피스 ․ 완화의료 활성화 방안 –노인장기요양서비스 이용자를 중심으로 최정수
연구 2015-08 주요 소득보장정책의 효과성 평가 연구 강신욱
연구 2015-09 돌봄 ․보건의료 연합서비스(Joned-up Services)공급 모형에 관한 전망과 과제 박세경
연구 2015-10 가족형태 다변화에 따른 부양체계 변화전망과 공 사 간 부양분담방안 김유경
연구 2015-11 공공 사회복지 전달체계의 변화와 정책적 함의 이현주
연구 2015-12 각국 공공부조제도 비교 연구: 스웨덴&프랑스&미국 편 임완섭
연구 2015-13 사회보장 역할분담 구조 변화와 정책적 대응방안 연구 정해식
연구 2015-14 시간제 일자리 확산이 소득불평등과 빈곤에 미치는 영향 김현경
연구 2015-15 사회보장재정 재구조화를 위한 중장기 전략연구 고제이
연구 2015-16 사회보장재정과 경제 선순환 국제비교연구 유근춘
연구 2015-17 공 ․ 사적 연금 체계의 노후소득보장 효과 전망과 발전 방향 우해봉
연구 2015-18 사회보장 중장기 재정추계 모형 개발을 위한 연구: 장기재정전망과 재정평가 신화연
연구 2015-19 사회복지법인의 재정운용 실태와 제도개선 방안 고경환
연구 2015-20 지역단위 복지서비스 수요 ․ 공급 분석 정홍원
연구 2015-21-01 가족변화에 따른 결혼 ․ 출산행태 변화와 정책과제 이삼식
연구 2015-21-02 임신 ․ 출산 및 영아기 양육 인프라의 형평성과 정책과제 이소영
연구 2015-21-03 동아시아 국가의 가족정책 비교연구 신윤정
연구 2015-21-04 여성노동-출산 및 양육행태와 정책과제 박종서
연구 2015-21-05 저출산 ․ 고령사회 동태적 분석을 위한 지역추적조사(Ⅲ) -정릉3동 ․ 영등2동 ․ 소태면 사례를 중심으로 오영희
발간번호 보고서명 연구책임자
연구 2015-21-06 은퇴전환기 중고령자의 일 ․ 여가현황과 여가증진방안 연구 강은나
연구 2015-21-07 노인돌봄(케어)서비스의 제공주체간 역할정립과 연계체계 구축 선우덕
연구 2015-21-08 연령통합 지표 개발과 적용 정경희
연구 2015-21-09 인구구조 변화와 사회보장 재정의 사회경제적 파급 효과 연구 원종욱
연구 2015-21-10 저출산 극복을 위한 아동보호체계 국제비교 연구: 한중일 비교를 중심으로 류정희
연구 2015-21-11 소셜 빅데이터 기반 저출산 정책 수요 예측 송태민
연구 2015-22 한국사회의 사회‧심리적 불안의 원인분석과 대응방안 이상영
연구 2015-23 건강영향평가 사업 운영 김정선
연구 2015-24 한국형 복지모형 구축: 생애주기별 소득 ․ 자산 ․ 소비 연계형 복지모형 구축 여유진
연구 2015-25 사회통합 실태진단 및 대응방안 Ⅱ: 사회통합과 사회이동 여유진/정해식
연구 2015-26 정책영향자의 사회통합 인식에 관한 연구 김미곤
연구 2015-27 아시아 각국의 복지제도 비교연구: 소득보장체계를 중심으로 노대명
연구 2015-28 2015년 지방자치단체 복지정책평가센터 운영 보고서 - 지역사회복지계획과 연차별 시행결과의 분석 강혜규
연구 2015-29 보건복지통계정보 통합 관리 및 운영 오미애
연구 2015-30-1 국민건강과 안전을 위한 아동안전전략 구축방안-아동손상예방 전략을 중심으로 김미숙
연구 2015-30-2 국민건강과 안전을 위한 식품안전전략 구축방안 김정선
연구 2015-31 2015년 전국 출산력 및 가족보건 ․ 복지실태조사 이삼식
연구 2015-32 2015년 한국복지패널 기초분석 보고서 노대명
연구 2015-33 2013 한국의료패널 기초분석보고서(Ⅱ)-만성질환, 임신 ․ 출산, 보건의식행태- 이수형
연구 2015-34 2015년 빈곤통계연보 정은희
연구 2015-35 2015년 소셜 빅데이터 기반 보건복지 이슈 동향 분석 송태민
연구 2015-36 의료기술 혁신과 의료보장체계의 지속성을 위한 국제동향과 정책과제 박실비아
연구 2015-37 보건분야 국제공동연구사업: 주요국 보건의료산업 육성정책 변화와 동향연구 김대중
